

New Republic



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NOVEMBER 29, 1948

FEAR, WAR AND THE BOMB:

★ **JAMES R. NEWMAN**

DISCUSSES NOBEL PRIZE

WINNER BLACKETT'S BOOK

15¢

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... in the press, on the 8:15, over the air, in the grocery store, down the village square, on Fifth Avenue. Die-hards finally concede a labor-farmer election victory, a liberal surge, the New Deal again, the coming of a government "for the people."

Yes, orthodox conservatism is on the wane, they admit, and the swing to the right which followed the war has been reversed.

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- ▶ more regulation of wages, rents, exports, bank credits?
- ▶ more policing of business, mandatory allocations, priorities, rationing of materials?
- ▶ less money for defense?
- ▶ more public power, aid to education, social security, medical-health research?
- ▶ how about taxes, the Taft-Hartley Act, civil rights, FEPC, anti-lynching, tidelands oil?
- ▶ what about public housing and slum clearance?



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WASHINGTON WIRE

THE OTHER NIGHT we got to thinking about all those phony, premature headlines announcing Dewey's "victory." What would they be saying now if Dewey *had* won? It's three weeks after the election; let's see.

The Dewey Glow is still gaining strength. Fulton Lewis Jr. and the New York *World-Telegram* are warning the CIO convention at Portland to remember the election returns: the Taft-Hartley Act is here to stay. *Time* magazine has just front-covered Herbert Brownell, "Dewey's Smiling Metternich," attributing to him the lofty "unity" strategy that won America's support. *Life* has brought out its bang-up Dewey Supplement in colors, showing the President-elect from Owosso Boyhood to President's Chair. The *Life* editorial, "Now for Aid to China," recalls that as far back as its June 21 issue ("The Truman Train Stumbles West") it noted Truman's "incredible ability to pretend that nothing at all was wrong"; that Truman had taken the "unfortunate" decision to speak "off the cuff," and that on his Western trip "crowds were small nearly everywhere."



Most newspapers now (in this supposititious Dewey victory) are advising the humbled Truman how to behave. Truman made a game fight, of course, but what the American people wanted was a President with dignity. Many want Truman to resign at once. Hardly a front page but shows the 'roguish Dewey dimples. Movie magazines have got to calling him "Glamor Man of the Year." There's a sweet piece in *Reader's Digest* on "Dewey's Mother."

Speculation on the Dewey cabinet is intense; the latest rumor gives Winthrop Aldrich the Treasury post. The stock market is booming, particularly public utilities and the shares of oil companies due to participate in the

tidelands-oil gravy. Republicans hold both houses. Back in Washington, victorious Senator Ball tells of his plan to compartmentalize collective bargaining to prevent nationwide strikes. The New York *Herald Tribune* quotes re-elected Harold Knutson as saying that taxes can be cut still more if foreign aid is trimmed.

There is a little cloud in the jubilation of some newspapers. There's a rumor that re-elected Senators "Curly" Brooks, Ball, Revercomb, Wilson, Robertson and other isolationists are preparing to fight "entangling alliances" under Taft leadership. The New York *Times* (which supported Dewey) warns plaintively against such tendencies.

The picture broadens. Republicans may exclude Senator Aiken from their caucus. The high-tariff boys are going into action. In Washington, the Un-American Activities Committee has just termed the grand-jury action against Chairman Thomas a "Red" plot. Condon and Lilenthal announce retirement. The Chicago *Tribune* is having a savage war dance over defeated Adlai Stevenson and Paul Douglas: "No Pink-O Professors for Illinois."

Well, that was the dream we had. It had a vivid reality. We even started to read all the editorials on the "power of the press," showing how, on the editors' fifth attempt, the public had followed their advice in choosing a President. We woke up screaming.

As we dope it out, Truman is consciously trying to restrain the fears of opponents and the exuberance of his followers by mild preliminary actions. Barkley, Rayburn and Truman himself have told industry at home that it has nothing to fear. In the foreign field, the emphasis has been placed almost ostentatiously on continuity; the trip to Moscow is rejected, Marshall praised, Dulles made temporary chair-

Christmas Shopping is WONDERFUL (as an idea!)

Yet, after you have been poked around and stamped on, after you have spent too much for too little, you begin to wonder—*why have Americans nearly destroyed a gracious custom?*

There remains, of course, the comfortable and economical way of remembering *particular* friends who share your lively interest in our times—give *New Republic* subscriptions!

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What will your friends—and you—find in *New Republic* in months ahead? That is as difficult to predict as the news of the day. But you have our word for it—if you will accept general terms—we will focus on the next Administration, foreign affairs, inflation, labor and industry, conservation, liberals, agriculture, education, the 81st Congress—in fact nearly all social, economic and political problems which influence the future of American democracy.

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FOR YOUR *Particular* FRIENDS—

New Republic

man of the US delegation at the UN. As to long-range plans, Truman is biding his time. We doubt if we shall know in detail till after the Inaugural.

We think, however, that the following is a fair summary of current State Department thinking. Russia is not seeking, nor is she capable of waging, early war. Nevertheless, she is carefully fanning war talk in order to get bargaining benefits. The US is winning the European phase of the struggle and should avoid stampede, appeasement or panic that might entice it into premature settlement before it can get better terms. Meanwhile, the primary task is still European reconstruction. It must not be interrupted even as rearmament goes on, including the new Atlantic security project.

As to China, Truman's victory means that the Luce-Howard-Bullitt campaign for all-out aid is defeated. For a while the US will probably do only urgent things, such as speeding arms and food to Shanghai and Nanking.

The greatest immediate perplexity is France. Most people don't know it, but observers here consider France potentially nearest to economic self-sufficiency of all Marshall Plan countries. Physical conditions in France would justify great hope, but political turmoil gets worse. Officials take a dim view of de Gaulle and fear extremist outbreaks if the weak center collapses.

Notes. The Pentagon is boiling again over three-way allocation of the military budget, with Air, Navy and Army leaders fighting like cats. Elderly, conservative committee chairmen like Senator George (D, Ga.), head of the Finance Committee, are picked by the vicious "seniority" system, irrespective of their views, and are already getting ready to knife Truman's program. . . . Lots of news comes these days from the churning real-estate market: J. Leo Kolb, local realtor, put an ad before election in Albany newspapers for choice estates and says he got a "good" response. Now the wife of defeated Democratic Governor Wallgren admits she is apartment-hunting here, a likely sign of federal appointment.

Washington

T.R.B.



LET'S BREAK THE PRECEDENTS NOW

PRESIDENT TRUMAN has promised to send to Congress the broad social program, including full civil-rights legislation, to which he and his party are committed. Against this program, the Tories of both parties are now mobilizing. They are a minority in Congress and in the nation. Their intention is to frustrate the will of the majority by exploiting the obsolete and undemocratic rules by which Congress is governed.

In the Senate, filibuster is the great barricade to reform. In the House, the barriers are the House Rules Committee's power to veto, and the Dixiecrats' power to sabotage. Already the National Association of Real Estate Boards is telling its members: Have no fear; these roadblocks to reform will stand.

The power to obstruct in Congress is not new; it is an old outgrowth of the early fear of the executive's power to dictate. Intended to safeguard democracy, it actually jeopardizes it in this case.

Yet Congress cannot remove the obstacles to its own democratic processes by its own efforts only. One attempt, in the Reorganization Act of 1947, modernized the cumbersome committee structure, improved some committee procedures and provided long-needed technical services. But the authors of the act, Senator La Follette and Representative Monroney, worked under terms of reference that forbade them to face basic problems. They were not allowed to suggest any changes in procedure on the floor of the Senate or House; they were barred from making any recommendations about the seniority rule in naming committee chairmen, or about the power of the House Rules Committee to lock up urgent legislation. Now real reforms are needed.

For 30 years, filibuster has been used to prevent enforcement of basic civil rights. Now, Southern reactionaries, supported by this obsolete device, are blackmailing the President. They are threatening to use the filibuster to defeat all progressive legislation if the full civil-rights program is reintroduced. The present Senate rules provide a solid basis for such threats. A two-thirds vote of the Senate is required, under a rule passed in 1917, to force to a vote any measure under consideration. This limitation applies only to a "pending measure." Even a two-thirds vote was powerless to end the poll tax last year when the Southerners chose to filibuster on a motion to call up the bill.

A reform program today requires that the Senate rules be revised. Cloture of debate on any motion or measure before the Senate should be permitted by a simple majority of Senators present and voting.

In the House, the Rules Committee is used as the counterpart of the filibuster. It considers only bills that other committees have reported. It makes little contribution to legislation. But all proposed legislation comes before it, to be buried or cleared in its own good time, according to its view of what is suitable for Congress to consider. Only with the greatest difficulty can a measure which it chooses to withhold be pried out of its grip. If a bill is held by a committee longer than 30 days, a petition signed by 218 Representatives can lead by stages to its being reported out on the second or fourth Monday of any month.

With scores of bills to be enacted in brief sessions, these delays amount to death for reform. With Eugene Cox of Georgia, Howard Smith of Virginia, Bayard Clark of North Carolina and Martin Dies of Texas as gravediggers, the Rules Committee was a cemetery for progressive legislation throughout the New Deal. In the hands of the same kind of men, the committee can make a shambles of a new program now.

Another urgently needed reform is an amendment permitting the calling up of a special order to discharge the Rules Committee from considering any bill it has failed to report within 14 calendar days. The President and his leaders should press for this in Congress.

Nominally, the new Rules Committee will consist of eight Democrats and four Republicans. But three of these "Democrats" are Cox, Smith and Clark. If they are allowed to hold their positions, they will continue to vote with the Republicans where a tied vote serves to block the reporting out of a bill. In their hands, the power of the committee to obstruct may still be decisive. Yet, it can be broken by the President in a way consistent with congressional precedent and the principles of party responsibility. No member of the 81st Congress who campaigned for the States' Rights ticket and against the Democratic ticket has any right to be designated a "Democrat" in the new Congress. If the Democratic caucus so instructs its Committee on Committees at its opening session, the Southern Representatives who

campaigned as Dixiecrats can be classed as minority-party members, as Vito Marcantonio (ALP, N. Y.) now is, and deprived of their committee positions.

There are ten such Southerners. They are Representatives F. Edward Hebert of Louisiana; John Rankin and John Bell Williams of Mississippi; George M. Grant and Sam Hobbs of Alabama; Cox and James C. Davis of Georgia; L. Mendel Rivers, Hugo Simms and James W. Hare of South Carolina.

The submerged Republicans are in no position to protest any disciplinary action. After the 1924 election 13 Representatives who supported La Follette and Wheeler were deprived of Republican committee assignments. Both major parties have removed committee chairmen from their positions for failure to support party policy. The real decisions of Congress are made in committee. With Cox replaced on the Rules Committee, Rankin replaced as chairman of the Veterans' Affairs Committee, Rankin and Hebert replaced on the Un-American Activities Committee, the Democratic majority in Congress can move from shadow to substance.

In addition to the avowed Dixiecrats, there are the old enemies of the New Deal among the Southern Democrats. The third great roadblock to reform is the disproportionate power which this group has gained by the congressional rules. Without logic or real reason, the rule of seniority gives control of congressional committees to this group. The seniority rule denies proper sectional representation in Congress, exalting and perpetuating one-party rule in the South, and serving to deny the chairmanship of a single House committee to any Western state. It is known in Congress as the senility rule because of the premium it places on age. It undermines party responsibility by placing a party program in the hands of its opponents.

Because of this rule, the tax program, the key to almost all legislation next year, is turned over to Walter George; social legislation is placed in the loving hands of Kenneth McKellar; farm policy is given to Elmer Thomas; John McClellan presides over the Committee on Expenditures, with its great powers to harass and intimidate government; Tom Connally speaks for America at the UN.

The seniority rule follows no law or requirement in Congress. It is simply a precedent which can be broken at any time in the caucus of the majority party. This is the best time for the precedent to be broken and the positions of committee chairmen given to the ablest men.

When our new program is cleared by the committees, an alliance of Southern Democrats and conservative Republicans will be waiting to break it up on the Senate and House floors. Yet if party government is to work in America, party platforms and promises must be binding. The Southerners who accepted the Democratic platform are fully committed to it. They should be held to it in a continuous party caucus in which decisions on legislation are reached by a two-thirds vote and are binding on all members.

Once again, precedent and power exist for drastic steps against those who defy caucus decisions. These include denial of all patronage, demotion or removal from committees, and finally refusal to grant recognition on the Senate and House floor.

Congress, like all venerable institutions, resists change. Even with 116 fresh minds in the House alone, the necessary reforms outlined here will be enacted only under pressure from the President and from public opinion. These musty rules, dull and irrelevant as they may seem, preside over every paycheck and dinner table in America.

THE WEEK

THE LIE-EVATT NOTE HELPED

ONCE AGAIN the Western Powers have reaffirmed the basic principle of their stand on the Berlin situation: they will not negotiate directly so long as the Soviet Union exerts blackmail pressure on them through the continued blockade of the former German capital.

Yet the proposal of Trygve Lie, Secretary General of the UN, and Dr.

Herbert V. Evatt, President of the UN General Assembly, has not been made in vain.

In rejecting the suggestion, the separate notes from Washington, London and Paris were written, in varying degrees, in a language of conciliation. Lie and Evatt noted "with satisfaction" that all four governments had "indicated in one form or another their desire to reach a settlement." And the issue goes back to the Security Council

in an atmosphere of lessened tension, if not of greater hopefulness.

It is easy to understand, and to sympathize with, the motives that must have prompted the two stalwarts of the UN to suggest that a major issue be taken, at least partly, out of the competence of that body. Only the most serious considerations could have led them to such a step. If the exchanges of the last week serve to clarify for US public opinion the nature of these considera-

tions, the Lie-Evatt proposal may go down in history as a failure that helped avert a more disastrous failure.

There can be no doubt that a vast majority of Western Europeans understand and accept the issue of principle in the Berlin situation, as the Western Powers see it. But a growing number of Western Europeans have been increasingly worried about the practical implications of a policy which Britain's authoritative weekly, the *Economist*, has described as "to go on testing Russian obstinacy to the utmost by patience and firmness." They feel that though they share with the Americans the stakes of this test, they are exposed to a greater share of its risks.

Behind the Lie-Evatt proposal is a sense of urgency, a desire to have everything humanly possible done to try to break the ever more dangerous deadlock between the West and East. And behind these is fear.

It is not mere chance that the Lie-Evatt proposal should have been made soon after spokesmen for the Vatican suggested direct talks between President Truman and Marshal Stalin. The approach of winter is a time of anxiety for Europe. The old continent is better off than it was a year ago but things are still far from normal. ECA has done wonders, but something like a miracle seems needed to assure peace.

It is not only that Western Europeans are afraid of war, though that fear is omnipresent and greater than Americans can recognize. While we, beyond an ocean, worry about atom bombs, they, in the very cockpit of the cold war, worry about a third real war on their soil. And the cold war is not only an international issue; in France, in Italy and elsewhere in Europe it takes the form of a domestic struggle for political power, a struggle composed of strikes, misery, hunger and anxiety.

As winter closes in, Western Europeans are also worried about the Berlin airlift. What if the weather makes it more difficult, even impossible? What if there are crashes, incidents? To what will they lead?

The UN has not been a rousing suc-

cess, but its very existence has been a comfort. What if the Berlin problem reveals its ultimate helplessness, reduces it to complete impotence?

The proposal to send Chief Justice Vinson to Moscow may have been impractical, but it showed imagination and daring. What if the military men who surround Truman, less judicious, than a member of the Supreme Court, push Russian obstinacy too hard and too far?

The principles guiding US policy are excellent. But are the methods that serve these ends really those of patience? After all, the Americans are not wholly right, the Russians not wholly wrong. And in the last analysis, the Americans are far away from Western Europe, the Russians relatively close by. The Russians use force and blackmail. The Americans leave diplomacy in the hands of generals.

These are some of the considerations that must have prompted Lie and Evatt. Americans should bear them in mind. In particular, it is the duty of peace-loving liberals to recognize the urgency and the fear that dominate Western European thinking.

The tone of the US note rejecting the Lie-Evatt proposal was good, but the words must be backed up. While we reaffirm our basic principle of no direct negotiation under duress, we should make every possible effort to utilize successfully the good offices of the Security Council.

Here, too, there is reason to believe that the Lie-Evatt proposal has had a good effect. Since Washington's note of rejection was sent, two steps in the right direction have been taken.

First, a number of our most competent financial experts have left for Paris to take part in a fresh study of Berlin's currency with Dr. Juan Atilio Bramuglia and representatives of the other five UN Security Council members not directly involved in the Berlin conflict.

Second, President Truman has appointed John Foster Dulles acting chairman of the US delegation, and Benjamin V. Cohen temporary chief delegate. It is a good sign that these two men, one a leading Republican,

the other a former New Dealer, will be helping the efforts at compromise without loss of principle. There are among the best legal minds in this country.

TOO BIG AND TOO SOON

As events in China move to some sort of Wagnerian third-act climax, the chief, and painfully visible, fact about US policy is that, in any effective terms, we have none. Even if we wanted to rush military supplies to Chiang Kai-shek in important amounts, it is probably too late to affect the outcome. Though by last weekend things seemed to be going somewhat better for Nanking than a little earlier, the government's claims of victories over the Communists were clearly subject to heavy discount; the collapse of the Kuomintang regime within the next few weeks still seemed probable.

Even Chiang's followers recognized the all-important time factor. They were pleading for an American gesture of moral support, and such a gesture was forthcoming in the announcement by the Economic Coöperation Administration that 120,000 tons of US food-stuffs were being rushed to Nationalist China. Meanwhile, talk was heard again of a possible coalition government between the Communists and the more moderate and liberal elements in the Kuomintang, with Chiang entirely out of the picture.

While the American government hesitated, one fact stood out: the danger of committing this country to a policy which might be rendered completely futile in a few weeks' time by the course of military events.

AMBASSADOR ROOSEVELT

If some of President Truman's advisers have their way, Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt will be staying on in Paris after her work as delegate to the United Nations General Assembly is finished. They are pressing for appointment of Mrs. Roosevelt as Ambassador to France.

In both the White House and State Department there has been almost com-

plete agreement for some time on the need for replacing Ambassador Jefferson Caffery with someone more understanding of a world moving away from reaction. Mrs. Roosevelt was considered for the post once before, but it was decided then that confirmation by the Senate of the 80th Congress would be doubtful. Now that hurdle has been removed by the election returns, which also make it more important than ever for the US to be represented by an ambassador who reflects the political temper of America.

Mrs. Roosevelt's proponents make a strong case for her appointment on the grounds that she would appeal to French labor, which is the keystone of French recovery and therefore of the success of ECA. One of the things she might be expected to accomplish would be building an embassy staff less at home in the Crillon Bar but more at home with leaders of labor and the vital social agencies of the French government.

THE HIRING HALL SAVED

SAN FRANCISCO (NR correspondent)

Now that the West Coast waterfront strike seems near settlement, it is time to consider precisely why the shipping business has been paralyzed for so many weeks. From the start, in September, it has been clear that this differed from the previous, easily understood strikes over wages and hours. This one had no mass picket lines or violence along the Embarcadero. Instead, it was cold war waged in the board rooms of shipping corporations and the back rooms of union headquarters.

The issue was whether unions should continue to be robust participants in the waterfront scheme or should be sapped slowly of their strength. The shipowners, counting on a GOP victory and more Taft-Hartley, had decided this was the time to break the unions. They had predicted confidently that after the election the unions would be called to Washington and have some sense knocked into their heads.

When Harry Bridges led his long-

shoremen out on strike, the owners claimed the walkout was Communist-inspired. They took an adamant position of no negotiations until the unions' leaders had been replaced, with the further stipulation that the leaders must comply with the T-H non-Communist-affidavit provisions.

In a secret ballot 94 percent of the longshoremen backed up Bridges—a perfectly rational position since the law requires the affidavits only if a union wishes to make use of NLRB machinery, and the NLRB was not involved in the dispute. The union never weakened during the strike, never retreated from its stand that hiring halls must remain in union hands.

Once the election returns were in and negotiations resumed, some shipowners and waterfront employers admitted privately that their side had made a mistake in pushing the unions so far. That documented the unions' contention that the employers had been bent on destroying unionism.

To get negotiations started, a little face-saving was allowed the employers by inclusion of two national CIO officials, Allen S. Haywood and R. J. Thomas, among the negotiators to "stabilize" the West Coast unions. One of the first agreements they reached was that the hiring-hall system continue just as before.

FAO LOOKS TO CONGRESS

The delegates of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, now meeting in Washington in their fourth annual conference, are looking to the 81st Congress to lay the basis of real security in the world's food supply. Although the world food situation has improved since last year's conference, stocks remain at the barest minimum and will still be low at the end of next year. While the food available this year was two percent greater per capita than last year, and both the US and European harvests were far above average, the world's greater dependence on US supplies increased the risks of crop fluctuations in this country.

The FAO delegates hope that the new Congress will begin an era of coöperation by reviving the International Wheat Agreement scuttled by the Republicans at the last session. Viscount Bruce of Australia, chairman of the FAO Food Council, referred to the "setback" given the agreement by Senator Arthur Vandenberg's Foreign Relations Committee last August and expressed the view that a new agreement between the big wheat-producing and wheat-consuming countries was of "great importance."

The original agreement guaranteed the major wheat-producing countries

Boston, F, Liggett Explains

IT'S GETTING a little late for explanations of what happened to Dewey, but we think a letter just received from an analyst in Ketchum, Oklahoma, is worth reprinting anyway. Though our friend, who signs himself Boston, F, Liggett, can't spell as well as Elmo Roper and Doctor Gallup, he seems to have a much more sensitive finger on the public pulse.

Mr. Liggett says:

"Here is two major reasons why the Republicans took a nose dive last election. Illinois was lost to the Republicans when Gov. Greene (Rep) and other powers that be, denied the Progressive Party, a place on the ballot, costing the Gov, a third term, and placing Ill, in the Democratic

column. Secondly, Gov. Dewey made a political broad cast in Chicago, declaring war on all Communists stating when elected he would stomp out all such movements whenever and wherever he found them' a pretty big order but most Americans hoped he could) Then he took a crack at the co-operatives declaring them to be practicing Communism, and said he would take care of them he had blasted over two million American citizens who were enjoying the savings of 10% or more by trading with the co-op system. That salvo cost Mr. Dewey Calif, Washington, Iowa, Minn, and a large block of votes, all of whom practices co-operative buying, so they concluded to let matters stay as they were."

fixed shares of the world market for the next five years. At the time of the Senate committee's rejection, Secretary of Agriculture Brannan protested on the ground that any new draft would be less favorable to the producing countries. He predicted that world prices would fall, and that importers would balk at taking wheat at fixed prices.

REALTORS FACE REALITY

CLEVELAND (NR correspondent)

Dewey's defeat was a great blow to the real-estate interests. Now they are revising their strategy to face the prospect not only of continued rent controls but also of greater congressional support of low-cost housing.

Delegates to the annual convention of the National Associations of Real Estate Boards, in session in New York, still talk of killing both rent control and public housing. But the more realistic leaders of the industry are lowering their sights. The present and more modest targets are to get most of the new construction work into the hands of private contractors, and to stress local controls so that real-estate interests can exploit the political power they hold in their communities.

Tighe Woods, the National Housing Administrator, told a gathering of real-estate men here in a post-election speech that controls will be continued on all housing except new construction; enforcement will be tightened through larger staffs and new legislation; area-wide rent increases will be allowed only if landlords can prove hardship.

This was bad news to his listeners. Earlier this year Cleveland landlords were asked about the trouble controls were causing them. Fewer than the required 3,500 answered, and the real-estate organization could not support their plea of hardship.

AFL KEYNOTES POLITICS

CINCINNATI (NR correspondent)

The Sixty-seventh Convention of the American Federation of Labor was a 10-day political rally that ended quite appropriately on Thanksgiving.

When Jack Hurst, president of the Cincinnati Labor Council, opened the convention, he did not tell of wages gained and members organized, but described the work of the political league. When the Executive Council submitted its report, about 150 of the 196 pages were devoted to political and legislative discussion. When the committee on local labor bodies submitted its report, spokesmen of local and state central bodies demanded that national and international unions instruct their local affiliates to join the geographical coordinating body, because it has now been proved that's the way elections are won.

William Green's keynote address dealt with inflation, housing, international policy and Israel, but said not a word about membership figures, wage gains, benefit programs and jurisdictional disputes. The committee on organization, proposing a stronger bid than ever for AFL-CIO unity, emphasized that "the recent political victory was won only by the cooperative efforts of all labor."

The political talk did not hide failure at the industrial level. However, the loss of 300,000 members since last year is more apparent than real because (a) the miners "disaffiliated" their more than half-million and (b) many unions, counting every penny for organizational warfare under Taft-Hartley, held back on per-capita dues to the parent AFL. Benefit services—sickness, death, unemployment, old age, disability—rose from \$52 million to \$60 million, despite Lewis' withdrawal. Union-shop elections under T-H found 90 to 95 percent of the workers voting "aye." And now, working on the assumption that T-H is virtually a dead letter, the AFL feels that the industrial-organizational problem is well behind it, and that it can really concentrate on political machinery.

Between now and early 1950, Labor's League for Political Education will be financed out of regular trade-union funds at 10 cents a head, yielding a basic sum of \$750,000. This is entirely permissible even under the

present law, which merely prevents contributions to campaigns for federal office. Dan Tobin dramatized the motion when, after getting the green light through an interpretation of young Albert Woll, AFL legal counsel, the teamster had presented a check of \$62,500 to Green. The move was doubly significant since Tobin, leaning Dewey-ward allegedly under the pressure of Dave Beck, was felt by many to have dragged his heels in the recent campaign and was a question mark for the future.

The AFL's political plans are fairly specific for the next two years. It seeks, first, to establish a basis for a broad electoral alliance. In recounting the work of Labor's League for Political Education, state by state, Director Joe Keenan emphasized that labor was most effective where it had a working alliance with farmers, rural-electrification groups, co-ops, veterans, teachers and liberals.

Secretary-Treasurer George Meany, more and more the driving force in top AFL circles, noted that "approximately nine out of ten congressmen who voted against labor's interests also voted against the interests of the consumer, the farmer and the veterans as well as the interests of the small businessmen." The final resolution called for closer work with "farm, professional, liberal non-partisan committees and other labor groups." This departure from trade-union parochialism at the operating level is paralleled by a widening of program at the legislative level.

Delaware, Kansas, Nebraska and South Dakota are the next points of political invasion on the AFL time table. For 1950, Senators Capehart and Cain are marked for elimination; Wagner's New York seat and Myers' Pennsylvania seat are marked for retention. Further specific plans include major efforts to change the complexion of state legislatures, a step that will give the political machinery greater permanence and attention to geographical detail. Woll (the younger) pointed out that 34 states now have laws more or less restrictive of trade-

union action. The "little Taft-Hartley Acts" will provide the unions with a unifying issue on state politics just as T-H itself provided the cement nationally.

International politics was also thrust right into the spotlight. A corps of workers on international affairs—Irving Brown, Henry Rutz, James Killen, Serefino Romualdi, Bert Jewel and Jay Lovestone—have made the very top levels of the AFL highly world-minded. The Longshoremen's Joe Ryan may never have lifted his eyes above the piers of Brooklyn, but when skilled European-minded strategists pointed out that the French Communists were describing his harbor tieup as a "sympathy strike" for the French strikers, Ryan widened his horizon to straighten out a press conference on the subject. (The American papers did little with his statement. The Europeans used it.) With the impending demise of the WFTU (World Federation of Trade Unions), Green told the fraternal delegate from Britain that the AFL was ready to join the non-Communist sectors of the WFTU in a new world body.

The end of parochialism and isolationism by the trade unions of the AFL also produced increased emphasis on "public relations." Instead of assuming that this was synonymous with employment of a highly paid press agent, the convention discussed the values of trade unionists on school boards, rent boards, library boards and community chests.


GUS TYLER

Allah, the All-Wise

A COMMUNIQUÉ from the Royal Palace in Cairo made known two divorces: that of King Farouk and Queen Farida of Egypt; and that of Shah Reza Pahlevi and Empress Fawzia of Iran, a sister of Farouk.

The Iranian divorce was explained by the fact "that Teheran climate did not suit Her Majesty, but constituted a danger to her health"; the Egyptian by the fact that "God's will ordered that the sacred relation between the noble couple be broken."

How mysterious are the ways of Allah, working sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly!



France's *armée de métier* of a generation ago had the traditions of a glorious past. Tradition itself reigned supreme at St. Cyr, the French West Point. Conservatism was the watchword, and only youths of the best families were admitted. Liberty, equality, fraternity might be the slogan of the Republic, but at St. Cyr authority, discipline and order took its place. When the young men were graduated they began more than a career; the army was to be their lifelong family, commanding not only their loyalties but also their deepest feelings and their clearest thoughts. Naturally, the relationship of a young officer with his first commander was more than professional; the colonel was a kind of father, his influence formative and enormous.

Thirty-seven years ago a young *Saint Cyrien* became a second lieutenant in the Thirty-third Regiment of Infantry. When the First World War began, he had his baptism of fire at Arras as a first lieutenant in the same regiment. The name of the young man was Charles de Gaulle. His colonel was Philippe Pétain.

Ten years later de Gaulle, now a captain, was on the staff of Pétain, now a general. As time passed, the lives and the careers of the two remained interwoven, the younger patterning himself on the older. But in 1940 the fabric of which they had both been part was torn to shreds: the French *armée de métier* was destroyed by Adolf Hitler's *Wehrmacht*.

De Gaulle had foreseen the disaster, had vainly tried to forestall it by preaching a doctrine of military mechanization. Pétain had rejected such a violation of a foot soldier's traditions. On this issue, their lifelong intimacy had bent. On another it broke: de-

Gaulle resisted the Germans, Pétain yielded to them. History justified de Gaulle; and it was as an instrument of history that he, more than any other man, was responsible for the final defeat and disgrace of his old colonel.

Now, from the prison on an island in the Mediterranean where he is paying for his treason and infamy, Pétain mumbles that what he did in 1940 he did for France. His followers, of whom there are hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, take up the refrain. These are the former collaborators, those who worked with the Nazis or those who simply did not resist. They point to the Communists and say that the Nazis were the lesser evil, that in 1940, as now, as always, France needed above all authority, discipline, order.

And now these Pétainists have a new *chef*. Most of them are in the ranks of the *Rassemblement du Peuple Français*, created and commanded by Charles de Gaulle.

The man who was a second lieutenant in the Thirty-third a generation ago stalks in the shadow of his old colonel. Pétain hated political parties, founded a "movement." The RPF is a "movement," not a party. Pétain thought of himself as "father" of France, talked of himself in the third person; de Gaulle does the same. Pétain set out to save France as one does an unruly child, removing from her such dangerous toys as liberty and equality; de Gaulle inveighs against the Constitution and the evils of parliamentarianism.

Pétain professed to speak for the ages. He held that France's long-term interests (as he saw them) were more important than her loyalty to the community of nations fighting Nazi tyranny. De Gaulle at his press conference last week spoke again of centuries and eternity, saying that France's long-term interests (as he saw them) were more important than her part in the Marshall Plan and Western Union.

And as Frenchmen this week got down in Parliament to the difficult and at times dangerous task of conducting a free democracy in a troubled world, many Americans were blinded by their concern for France and for the free

world. They failed to see the shadow of the colonel behind the second lieutenant.

★

John Foster Dulles' appointment as temporary head of the US team at the Palais de Chaillot is bigger news in France and Western Europe than in America. Part of the importance of the news comes from the impression that President Truman, right after his victory over the same people who tried to lick FDR, seems to be going back to the Rooseveltian practice of using the best brains in the biggest jobs, regardless of their party ties.

But there's a more pleasing aspect. Western Europeans know Dulles isn't any less anti-Communist than Secretary Marshall and the present team at the State Department. On ways and means, however, the senior partner of Sullivan and Cromwell hasn't seen eye to eye with the striped-pants boys and their friends at the Pentagon and in Wall Street. While they have been stressing a repowered Deutschland as a buffer against the East, Dulles has tended to plump for a refurbished France.

Before Dulles got word of his appointment, he made a speech before the American Club in Paris. He backed the idea of having Germany in Western Union, but on terms very different from Herbert Hoover's and William Draper's. The Germans, he said, have "great potentialities for good and evil." You could safely give them a chance to develop "as a small minority—say 20 percent—of Western Europe." But no more. "As one of several separate independent nations in Europe, strategically located," he warned, "the Germans would have a tempting opportunity to maneuver their way back to a dominant position. No agreements which might be imposed today should be looked upon as reliable protection against that risk."

Dulles couldn't have chosen a better moment. While he was speaking, the French National Assembly's Foreign Affairs Committee was setting the stage for an explosion of angry oratory about the return of the Ruhr to Germany. Of course, Dulles's words

weren't technically a statement of official US policy. Still, the upgrading of the man who spoke them was taken as the best kind of news by Western Europeans, whose German-inflicted wounds are deeper than ours.

★

Juan Peron didn't like the way Spruille Braden ran Latin American affairs for the State Department. Nor did Joseph Stalin. Both dictators took a poor view of Braden's tough policy of fostering moderate elements against the extremes of world communism and native fascism.

Evita's colonel threw his weight around in Buenos Aires, and pulled strings in places in New York and Washington where the pulling would have the greatest effect. Braden was pulled down and out of the State Department. Appeasement of the Peronista reactionaries all over Latin America became US policy.

News from Lima shows part of the result. Peru's new Dictator-President, General Manuel Odria, has banned the Apra Party and is hunting down its members in the best Gestapo manner. This moderate organization was anti-Communist, but because it stood for liberal democracy, Odria regards it as "hidden communism." Score one for Peron.

But Odria has also shelved the "Sechura" contract which would have given US oilmen the right to exploit five million acres of coastal desert, brought \$400 million of US capital into Peru, and given jobs at livable wages to thousands of miserably poor Peruvian workmen. Apra favored the contract, the Communists didn't, nor did the reactionaries. Score a putout for Stalin, and an assist for Peron.

The Peruvian Supreme Court has voided a sentence against an Aprista accused of having murdered a member of the Alianza Nacional, the reactionary party. The evidence was political rather than legal. A new trial was ordered.

It doesn't take a new trial of the present US policy in Latin America to judge that it pays off—for Stalin and Peron, not for Uncle Sam.

★

Umberto di Savoia lives in Cascaes, a Portuguese village on the Tagus. His neighbors include Carol of Rumania, Don Juan of Spain and the Count of Paris. The other day he sent word to Alcide de Gasperi that he wouldn't mind returning to the Quirinal in Rome. Perhaps he got homesick. Or maybe he is acquiring the habits of some of his neighbors. They fish.

★

The Israeli government's reply to the UN Security Council's demand for withdrawal from the Negev is a gem of diplomatic double-talk worthy of the Council's own best efforts. Tel Aviv announces compliance with the demand: the forces that fought their way into the southern desert have been withdrawn. But the Israelis who were there before October 14 will remain. This amounts to a *fait accompli*: Israel holds the reacquired soil without disobeying the Council.

It is hard to believe that the Israeli stand is anything but what the Council itself asked for by its evasions on the whole Palestine question. Theoretically, the Council was to deal out objective justice. But it has long been obvious that the major protagonists in the UN debates have not been doing their prodding and pushing with quite clean hands. Britain, America and Russia have all been serving their own national interests in the name of international justice and peace.

Thus far, the Council hasn't accepted the facts in Palestine: the Israelis have won their war; even King Abdullah of Transjordan asks his fellow Arabs to "accept the logical."

But the logic may finally be imposed by US domestic politics which also has been playing a part in the UN's "objectivity." Truman's reelection is another *fait accompli*, and the seesaw of US policy has again tilted in favor of Israeli's ownership of the Negev. Sooner or later the UN will rubberstamp what was done by Israeli valor and daring plus US expediency. What a great triumph that will be for UN justice and power!

FEAR, WAR AND THE BOMB

*Blackett, winner of 1948 Nobel physics prize,
concludes we cannot count on—and need not fear—
a clean, push-button war*

by James R. Newman

P.M.S. BLACKETT's sober analysis of the most terrifying problem of our time far excels any evaluation of the military and political consequences of atomic energy that has thus far appeared.

It is not a book in any sense free of prejudices; the subject of course is perfect for prejudices. But when allowance has been made for the author's reputed bias, there remains an imposing array of irrefutable conclusions as valuable as they are at variance with common opinion. Dr. Blackett defends two theses.

First, that atom bombs cannot achieve a quick, cheap, military knock-out in a war between Russia and the United States; second, that neither the Baruch plan nor the counter proposals by Gromyko offer a realistic and satisfactory solution for the international control and development of atomic energy. Having established these matters, he briefly proposes "A Way Out" which is, I fear, more of an exit for the author than a satisfactory climax to his presentation. His admitted failure, however, to find a "recipe for action" in no way diminishes the outstanding merit of the work as a whole; and it is to a somewhat detailed review of the arguments supporting his principal contentions that I would like to draw your attention.

To evaluate the present military situation regarding atomic energy and to attempt to predict the future—over the next decade—demands a careful re-examination of the past. A correct appraisal is needed not merely of the results at Hiroshima and Nagasaki but, equally important, of the air war in Europe and the Pacific. This is the "first maxim" of a scientific study. It happens, as Blackett shows, that although adequate, reliable information is available from which to make the

appraisal, accepted views about this phase of military, technological and political history rest almost entirely upon misconceptions. And each misconception affects profoundly our attitude to current events, especially atomic warfare. For this reason almost half of the book is devoted to a careful scrutiny of certain military events between 1939-45 and to a refutation of prevailing beliefs concerning them.

Consider first the war in Europe. Everyone was asked to believe that British and American airpower won the war; that German production was crippled by US "precision" bombing (or, as it was sometimes ironically called, "pickle-barrel" bombing) and by the great British area or "strategic" night raids that set fire to German cities and broke the population's morale; that even if the Allied raids were indiscriminate and wanton, they were

*Professor P. M. S. Blackett, British physicist and 1948 Nobel Prize winner, has aroused worldwide attention with his new book, **Military and Political Consequences of Atomic Energy**, not as yet published in the United States. He holds a position sharply at variance with the official attitudes of the British and American governments. The British delegation to the United Nations has, in fact, taken the unprecedented step of distributing to every delegate an elaborate refutation.*

*James R. Newman, author of the following discussion of Professor Blackett's views, is a frequent New Republic contributor. Former counsel to the US Senate Committee on Atomic Energy, he is the author, with Byron Miller, of the recent book, **The Control of Atomic Energy**.*

justifiable as reprisals against the terror attacks by the Luftwaffe on Coventry, Hull, Bristol and London; that the Nazis attempted to bomb the British out of the war but were beaten at their own game.

Too many people still subscribe to these beliefs and yet each of them, as Blackett shows, is almost entirely unfounded. "Of the major contestants in the war, it seems to have been the British who first planned and put into operation a campaign of strategic bombing with the intention of attempting to achieve a decisive result by the use of air power alone."

The German Air Force, from the beginning, was designed as a tactical arm to be used in coöperation with the ground forces; as such it achieved brilliant success. Only when diverted from this original objective, notably in the Battle of Britain, did it suffer its heaviest defeats. That Hitler was not moved by humanitarian considerations in his decision to concentrate on military and industrial installations and to avoid large-scale attacks against cities is shown by the indiscriminate raids on Warsaw, Belgrade and Rotterdam. But these raids, it should be noted, were a prelude to the advance of ground troops. The British, on the other hand, did not until late in the war realize the limitations inherent in the war doctrines of Douhet, Seversky and the other air prophets.

When the British were weak and the odds overwhelmingly against them, they struck at Germany the only way they could: there were repeated raids on Freiburg, Hanover and Berlin in the somber summer of 1940 well before the Nazis retaliated with their attack on London. Even after their fortunes had changed and ultimate victory for the Allies was no longer in doubt, the restricted air policy based on military and political expediency initially adopted by the GAF did not appeal to the British.

During the European war Anglo-American forces dropped on all targets a total of 2.7 million tons of bombs. Of this immense cascade of high explosives and incendiaries more than half poured on Germany. What

was the effect of this war of "devastation and terrorization unrivaled [I quote from General J. F. C. Fuller's *The Second World War*] since the invasions of the Seljuks"? On this vital point we need not, fortunately, depend on the judgment of special

pleaders. There are available the invaluable reports of the US Strategic Bombing Survey, reports which, for understandable reasons, had not the advantage of the press agency usually lavished by the Air Force on its pronouncements and achievements.

How Good Was Our Aim?

I CAN SIMPLIFY the exposition by dividing the analysis of the air offensive in two parts: the first directed against the German economy, the second against German morale. Large-scale raids in both classes, as the Survey shows, were an astonishing failure. Economic attacks from May, 1940, to March, 1942, conducted by the RAF mostly at night, had a negligible effect on German industry if for no other reason than that the long-range bomber force at hand was insufficient "to attain remunerative results." Daylight attacks by the USAAF against specific German industries, from August, 1942, to March, 1944, were only moderately successful. Certain major industries—ball bearings, for example—which were the objects of costly and heroic raids were, according to the Survey, wholly unaffected in output. But what was even more frustrating (or, I should perhaps say, what *would have been* frustrating had the Allied air command paid attention to the repeated findings of the bomb-damage assessment unit working throughout the war at the Ministry of Home Security Station at Princess Risborough) was the fact that German factories were so speedily and efficiently rebuilt that over-all German production, including aircraft, ammunition, weapons, tanks and naval construction, continued to rise—reaching its peak in the fall of 1944 after three-quarters of a million tons of bombs had been dropped on the fatherland alone. Look at the results in the simple arithmetic of Kaldar's table:

INDEX OF TOTAL GERMAN WAR PRODUCTION (Index 1940 = 100)	
1941 — 101	1943 — 229
1942 — 146	1944 — 285

So contrary to expectations were these findings that one might conclude (following John Stuart Mill's canons of inductive logic one would certainly have done so) that there is a positive correlation between bombing and production: the more of the first the stronger the second. It is indeed a plausible conjecture that the effect of the morale attacks, at any rate, was directly opposite to that intended.

In obedience to the Casablanca decision to destroy German morale, 700,000 tons of bombs were dropped in 1943-44. These raids cost the Allies by far the greater part of 40,000 planes and of 180,000 flyers. The result is shown in this USSBS table:

LOSS OF PRODUCTION DUE TO AREA BOMBING OF GERMAN CITIES		
Year	Tonnage	Loss as % of Annual Reich Production
1943	135,000	9.0
1944	255,000	17.0
1945 (to Apr.)	97,000	6.5



P. M. S. BLACKETT

And then consider this excerpt (selected by Fuller) from the Survey:

[In 61 German cities] 3,600,000 houses were destroyed or heavily damaged—that is, 20% of Germany's total residential area: 7,500,000 people were rendered homeless, about 300,000 killed and 780,000 injured. . . . [But] the mental reaction of the German people to air attack is significant. Under ruthless Nazi control they showed surprising resistance to the terror and hardships of repeated air attacks, to the destruction of their homes and belongings, and to the conditions under which they were reduced to live. Their morale, their belief in ultimate victory or satisfactory compromise, and their confidence in their leaders declined, but they continued to work efficiently as long as the physical means of production remained. *The power of a police state over its people cannot be underestimated.* (Italics mine—J.R.N.)


It would of course be wholly incorrect to infer from this evidence that air power was not a major factor in the victory over Germany. Apart from its tactical role in coöperation with land and sea forces, air power achieved spectacular strategic results after German fighter defenses had been seriously weakened by losses incurred in combat. In the spring of 1944 the Allied high command began to realize that it was not necessary, in order to kill a man, to rip out his vital organs, flatten him with a steam roller and set fire to the remains. A well-placed stiletto or suitable pressure on the windpipe would, it appeared, do nicely. A nation at war can be hurt badly by laming its transport and by drastically curtailing its fuel supplies.

Radar and pathfinder methods, among others, increased the efficiency of the British night raids to the point where the bombs were at least dropped on the right cities if not on the designated installations; American bombers, fighters and fighter bombers smashed at railroad bridges, marshaling yards and oil refineries with decisive results. By the time ground operations were well under way the collapse of German industry had set in. Troops could neither be speedily removed nor properly supplied; oil production in September of 1944 plunged to five percent

of the January rate; the GAF sat helplessly on its fields while Allied aircraft hunted almost at will. But the final breakdown, it is essential to realize, was the result of the combined operations of all arms on two fronts, of the huge losses inflicted in the East on German manpower, of air attacks made possible by the crippling of the GAF, and was only to a negligible extent the result of mass raids against cities.

General Fuller, who does not, to put it mildly, share Blackett's political views and who is regarded as perhaps the ablest living military analyst, goes well beyond Blackett in his condemnation of strategic bombing. Because of the immense production requirements of this form of aerial warfare, "nearly every campaign following the final establishment of the Allied initiative in the West in November, 1942, was cramped by lack of landing craft or crippled by lack of transport aircraft. Therefore [says Fuller] the conclusion is that, as an experiment, the strategic bombing of Germany up to the spring of 1944 was an extravagant failure. Instead of shortening the war, its cost in raw materials and industrial manpower prolonged it."

In the Pacific, strategic bombing undoubtedly made a heavier contribution to the defeat of our enemies than had been the case in Europe. Post-



poning for a moment consideration of the significance of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, I would outline Blackett's position (again derived from the USSBS reports) as follows. The Allied Pacific air campaign "consisted of precision attacks on military targets, together with devastating attacks on

cities. . . ." (The greatest raid of all time, not excluding those with atomic bombs, was that of March 9, 1945, on Tokyo.) Japanese production, always a touch-and-go affair in relation to Japanese requirements, deteriorated rapidly once the Allied navies and air forces had destroyed the enemies' merchant marine and Japanese imports, including essential oil and bauxite, were virtually cut off. In November of 1944, before mass attacks had begun, the output of even high-priority items had "turned down." The homeland raids inflicted considerable damage; but in the over-all assessment four points should be remembered for their

bearing on the problems of atomic warfare:

- ❑ The area attacks and those on specific targets were, in many segments of the economy, "duplicative" in effect (e.g., refineries were already out of oil, aluminum plants out of bauxite).
- ❑ Attacks could not be mounted until bases within 1,500 miles of the mainland were captured.
- ❑ Japanese defenses were woefully weak by the time the daylight raids were staged, and the bases themselves were almost immune to counter-attack.
- ❑ Japan was "on the verge of economic collapse" when the main raids began.

How "Decisive" Is the Atom?

I HAVE ELABORATED on this part of the Blackett study for a number of reasons. First, because his contentions are so completely based upon independent and unimpeachable evidence; second, because his inferences are corroborated by the opinions of other experts who are invulnerable to the charges of extreme left-wing sympathies, charges of the kind made, not altogether without cause, against Blackett; third, because the military and political policies of the US and Great Britain as regards the future use of atomic weapons must derive in large measure from the strategic-bombing experiences of the last war. Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Operations Able and Baker at Bikini have, to be sure, yielded much information relevant to these policies.

On the other hand, as Blackett argues forcefully, the nature of atomic warfare—at least those of its characteristics that can be reasonably prefigured at this time—is not so utterly different from the aerial warfare of the period 1939-45 that one is justified in disregarding the lessons of the immediate past. Generals, says the old platitude, are prepared at the beginning of each new war to fight the one that has gone before: there is no particular satisfaction to be derived from the thought that our air strategists are so free of this occupational infirmity that they are planning the

next war with weapons of imagination.

Are atomic bombs so destructive that they must be considered in an entirely new framework of ideas? President Truman described the Hiroshima (U-235) bomb as equivalent to 20,000 tons of TNT; the Nagasaki (plutonium) bomb with a 15 percent greater radius of destruction produced a blast wave slightly more powerful. Does this mean that a plutonium bomb is equivalent to 2,000 10-ton blockbusters? Blackett shows that this is not the case. Because the bomb "overhits" its target (and "overkills"—after all, how dead can a man get?), pulverizing nearby objects to an unnecessary degree, its effectiveness in terms of structural damage is equal to only about 2,250 tons of ordinary bombs properly distributed over the target. As for total killing power, the comparisons are less clear. Population density, building construction, availability of shelters, surprise—these are among the factors to be considered. On balance one may, however, accept for the total effectiveness of plutonium bombs the USSBS statement:

The atomic bomb in its present state of development raises the destructive power of a single bomber by a factor of between 50 and 250 times, depending upon the nature and size of the target. The capacity to destroy, *given control of the air* [my italics] and an adequate supply of bombs, is beyond doubt. Un-

less both of these conditions are met, however, any attempt to produce war-decisive results through atomic bombing may encounter problems similar to those encountered in conventional bombing.

Can the power of atomic bombs be increased? John J. McCloy, former Assistant Secretary of War, in an article in the *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, writes of bombs ten times as powerful as that used at Hiroshima and asserts this to be a conservative estimate of the augmentation to be expected by 1957. If we could utilize atomic energy from elements at the other end of the periodic table, Nagasaki bombs x 1,000 could be made. Blackett dismisses the second possibility as being, for the present at least, too conjectural; instead, he regards as feasible "improved" atomic bombs destructively equivalent to 3,000 tons of ordinary high explosives.

Even with this reestimate of its destructive power the atomic bomb remains a hideous and incomparable weapon. A single bomb can kill tens of thousands of people in New York and Washington as quickly as in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It can turn other thousands into masses of diseased protoplasm which will grow on in fantastic, funguslike shapes. But what the downward revision of the bomb's potential does mean is that a handful or a few hundred of these weapons cannot conceivably achieve military victory. To do the same damage in Russia or in the United States that was done in Germany would require *several thousand* atomic bombs. And where are these to come from? One may judge US bomb-making capacity—and, inferentially, Russia's as well—from the statement of Dr. J. R. Oppenheimer to the effect that "it would take about two years to accumulate one thousand bombs if the country knew how to make them and started with peacetime atomic plants."


As Blackett points out, "the magnitude of the technical and industrial problems of producing bombs makes it likely that it will be many years before the Soviet Union will possess a large enough stockpile of bombs to be useful against American cities." And

it is also highly improbable that Russia would start a war with atomic weapons without the possibility of any other military follow-up and with the certainty of retaliation by a nation possessing a much larger number of nuclear weapons. For the average man or woman it is not the question whether he or she will be killed by an atomic bomb once war has been started—for death is death and a high-explosive bomb is an equally effective killer for those within range. Instead, the question is whether Russia is likely to start a war, in view of her inferior position with respect to atomic stockpiles and the certainty that a sporadic atomic raid cannot ensure victory.

Assuming an atomic war between Russia and the US in the next ten years, how would the bombs be conveyed to the target? This is a matter of supreme importance upon which we have had a flood of supremely foolish pronouncements from scientists as well as military leaders. Saboteurs carrying bombs in violin cases and planting them in our cities is not an idea to be taken too seriously. After all, a nasty saboteur with a box of matches would also do well for himself provided he had access to the right places—which he would gain more easily without a violin case.

What are the chances of a push-button war with pilotless weapons of the rocket or aircraft type? On this point you may take your choice between Blackett, on one side, and the hucksters and madhouse boys of the Sunday supplements, on the other. Blackett holds: "No such devices seem likely within the next ten years to be accurate enough to deliver an appreciable fraction of missiles into any target smaller than a large city at a 1,000 miles range." His conclusion is supported by a number of the best-qualified authorities, including Rear Admiral Parsons, pioneer in atomic-bomb development and Director of Atomic Defense for the Navy.

This seems to lead us back to the problems of "old-fashioned" strategic bombing and it becomes necessary once again to think of such matters as



suitable bases, bomb loads, the range and speed of bombers; the defensive power of fighter interceptors, availability of targets and the like. In other words, a war with atomic weapons poses for the attacker many of the limitations and inordinately difficult obstacles encountered by the Allied Air Forces in Europe and the Pacific. The vision of the clean, fast, economical, impersonal push-button war grows dim. Few of us know what the Air Forces think on this matter but here are excerpts from Navy opinion:

The large subsonic bombing aircraft, on the other hand, operating at extreme range, and without a heavy fighter escort, cannot be considered a sufficiently reliable means of delivering scarce and expensive atomic bombs. . . . The present technological trend is decidedly in favor of the defense as against the offense in ordinary strategic bombing.

Is America in grave danger of an overnight atomic holocaust? So we are often informed; but what are the facts? Bases from which either piloted or pilotless aircraft can be launched against us by the Russians are clearly nonexistent. The closest Russian base is many thousands of miles from the American mainland. This is a geographic fact which, for some melancholy reason, never seems to dampen the enthusiastic hysteria of the press, local police chiefs and other oracles warning of another Pearl Harbor. In any case, it follows from existing limits on the destructive power of atomic bombs that, even if a sneak plane got through, no decisive military advantage could be gained and only mass raids entailing hundreds of long-range bombers and carrying great numbers of atomic bombs could erase a city.

No decent person with any sense advocates preventive war. So cautious a thinker as Dr. Conant of Harvard

denounces the idea as "criminal folly." But strategists like General Arnold, William Bullitt and Walter Winchell will be encouraged by Blackett's list of American bases in Turkey, North Africa, Japan, Western Germany and so on, from which easy long-range bomber runs over the Russian mainland could emanate.

A weakness in Professor Blackett's analysis relates to his evaluation of radioactivity as an after-effect of the explosion of the bomb itself. It has been stated that at Hiroshima and Nagasaki little radioactivity remained on the ground. But these bombs were exploded well up in the air so as to increase the radius of destructive blast and lethal radiation. Bombs exploded nearer to the ground might well have much more lingering radioactive after-effects, though their immediate demolition and killing power would correspondingly be diminished. Danger from radioactivity is greatly increased in attacks on ports or harbors, as was shown at Bikini, where intense radioactivity "remained for several months in the water and on the ships which had been deluged with active water. . . ." Here Blackett's comments are somewhat superficial, but I do not believe that they seriously weaken his main arguments.

He is understandably cautious on the subject of poisons which might be spread (without bombs) over enemy countries in the form of radioactive fission products. In a recent article by Dr. Oppenheimer it was suggested that US air squadrons could "eradicate more than 40 million people by an attack on the USSR." As Blackett points out, this opinion must be based on the assumption of radioactive poisons rather than atomic bombs, since at least 1,000 Nagasaki-type bombs perfectly placed would be required for such extensive extermination. But this side of atomic warfare is as mysterious as bacteriological warfare and little that is definite can be said of it. (I do not mean to imply that this is very reassuring.)

So much for the "absolute" weapon. It is altogether clear from Blackett's



DRAWINGS BY MELVILLE BERNSTEIN

array of proof that a war between Russia and the US would be, so far as can be foreseen, a long, agonizing, bloody struggle requiring the full cooperation of all arms. A push-button attack is a dream, and a bad dream at that. Atomic bombs might be used in a kind of super-strategic-bombing offensive, but this could hardly achieve a quick decision. The tactical use of atomic bombs against troop concentrations and landing operations would undoubtedly necessitate changes in mili-

tary planning; ports and harbors would be particularly sensitive to attack; the effect of residual radioactivity and radioactive poisons might profoundly alter existing concepts of strategy and defense. There remains the problem of conveying the thousands (not merely a few) of weapons to the target and this is not likely to be solved by revolutionary methods in the near future.

Consequently, it seems that Americans have been the victims of a gigantic myth spun by well-intentioned but ignorant fearmongers and ill-intentioned, equally ignorant, warmongers. Blackett disposes of the push-button-war argument by the logic of the Irishman: "On seeing a stove advertised to save half one's fuel, he bought two to save it all! If two bombs could save a million American lives in a war with Japan, then a hundred would save them all in a war with Russia." The refusal of the Russians to swallow the myth is, I admit, infuriating; but it goes a long way toward explaining their attitude on international control

The Tiger by the Tail

IN THE SECOND portion of his book Blackett attempts to show why the Russians were justified in rejecting the Baruch plan. I find this analysis not quite as convincing as what went before but extremely useful none the less. Blackett has given us what he considers to be the truth and nothing but the truth. Unfortunately what we need is the whole truth; but one may doubt whether any single man could give it. I must content myself with a somewhat sketchy and fragmentary paraphrase of Blackett's survey.

The Baruch plan proposed the creation of an Atomic Development Authority to which should be entrusted (1) "managerial control or ownership of all atomic energy activities potentially dangerous to world security"; (2) control, inspection and licensing of non-dangerous activities; (3) research, development and the "fostering" of "beneficial uses of atomic energy."

Once the control machinery had been put into full operation, the manufacture of all bombs was to cease; existing bombs disposed of pursuant to the terms of the agreement; the ADA to have possession of all "secrets" and "know-how." There was to be "condign punishment" for violation of any of the rules of control; and the unanimity rule of the UN Security Council was to be suspended with respect to such violations.

Now whether the American delegation actually expected acceptance of its plan without modification is uncertain: there are grounds for believing that it did not. But what is more to the point is that when the UN dropped, for the time being at least, any attempt to achieve an agreement, the US had not in any material respect altered its proposal. The counter proposal by Gromyko—essentially a Kellogg Pact to outlaw atomic bombs and other weapons of mass destruction—

was evidently a hurried diplomatic makeshift which the Soviets on their part never expected the Americans to accept. It was put forward, in all likelihood, as a play for time and a lever for gaining concessions.

What were the weaknesses of our plan from the Russian standpoint? This is Blackett's diagnosis.

1. The control system was to be evolved "in stages"—a condition first laid down in the Truman-Attlee-King statement. The completion of each stage, it was said, would provide the necessary confidence for entering upon the ensuing stage. It was for the UN Atomic Energy Commission to decide, presumably by majority or two-thirds-majority vote, when a given stage had been satisfactorily completed and when the next might be entered. Had each stage preserved a symmetry of the rights and obligations arising under it with respect to Russia and the US; or, to put it differently, had the relative position of the powers with respect to such matters as their own security remained the same throughout each stage, strong arguments, both in equity and practical politics, could have been advanced on behalf of this scheme.

But Blackett denies that this symmetry ever existed. Indeed he contends that the earlier stages of the proposed plan, including control over the mining of uranium, and geological and aerial surveys, would have altered the relative security of the powers much to Russia's detriment. Since the majority of the Commission favored the US, "it is hardly to be expected that the USSR would consider such a situation to differ in essentials from one in which the United States of America was explicitly given the sole right to determine the timing of the stages."

The point goes further. What guarantee had the Russians that successive American Congresses (and changing governments) would approve what had gone before and permit execution of the later stages envisaging the release of our most closely guarded information and the turning over to the ADA

of our stock of bombs? There is, to be sure, no reason to believe that America would act less honorably in these dealings than Russia—assuming one can use such an old-fashioned word as "honor" in regard to transactions in the international bazaar. Yet one may note that the American proposal contained at least one paragraph which was calculated to deepen Russian suspicion of our good faith. (I say "deepen" because Blackett devotes an entire chapter to arguing, not altogether unconvincingly, that the dropping of an atomic bomb by the US on Hiroshima on August 6—two days before Russia entered the war against Japan, pursuant to her commitment at Potsdam—was a political move against Russia even more than a military move against Japan. I hold no firm opinions on this point but I should certainly want to see some of Blackett's plausible arguments refuted before rejecting his thesis out of hand.) "But before a country [said Baruch] is ready to relinquish any winning weapons it must have more than words to reassure it. It must have a guarantee of safety, not only against the offenders in the atomic area, but against the illegal users of other weapons—bacteriological, biological, gas—perhaps (why not?) against war itself."

What should one make of this? More pertinently, what did the Russians make of it? The historian must at least entertain the possibility that the Russians saw in this a saving clause which the US—certainly Congress—might invoke as a reason for abandoning the international-control convention at any stage. We should be entirely within our legal rights, it would seem, to refuse to dispose of atomic bombs till a satisfactory control over biological warfare, say, had also been accepted.


I am not disposed to think America would risk a charge of double-dealing at the bar of world opinion; yet at the bar before which we choose to plead, Russia already is in poor graces and she would be unwise to entrust her security to such a tribunal.

2. We may suppose the Russians to

be as deeply concerned—if not quite so nervous—as we are, regarding national security. It is then easy to see that the "asymmetry" of the very first stages of the Baruch plan would make it immediately unacceptable. Almost the initial step is to be a worldwide survey for raw materials. This would provide the UN with a "fairly complete target map of the USSR." Rightly or wrongly—and from the military standpoint certainly rightly—the Soviets would consider secrecy about the exact location of their military and industrial installations of paramount importance. While our own industrial geography is as yet no secret, this cannot be considered as restoring the symmetry since bases for US attacks on Russia are available, but not the other way around.

3. In any setup where decisions on atomic-energy control depended on majority vote, Russia would probably be outvoted. I mentioned this when discussing the vote of the Commission as to stages. It arises again when considering the enormous powers of the ADA. Critical decisions on mining, peacetime uses of atomic energy, licensing, inspection, allocation of raw materials and plants would all be determined by a body whose Russian members would be in the minority. The same condition would prevail in the Security Council if the veto were to be abrogated as to atomic-energy decisions.


More generally on this matter of the veto, to which Blackett devotes



much attention, it is well to be reminded that where sanctions are involved the US is no more willing than Russia to leave its destiny, including possible involvement in a foreign war, to majority vote. Secretary Marshall said recently, "We do not want our manpower and our strength committed by a two-thirds vote." The

veto is "necessary . . . where acts of aggression are concerned." A serious violation of ADA rules would, it seems to me, come under this head.

Even in a world divided into two camps, an international organization can be effective, and contribute to sta-



bility and peace, if the disputes brought before it end in nothing worse than a stalemate. Stalemates consume time and time is a remarkable refrigerant. That is one explanation of the apparently illusory but nevertheless very real pragmatic value of the veto. Majority decisions on the other hand, especially those involving sanctions, will almost certainly lead to war if a major power is to be punished. If the atomic bomb were an "absolute" weapon and were held exclusively by an international authority, the overall international body might endure even where majority-decision sanctions were invoked. But since the weapon is not absolute, it is difficult to see what sanctions could achieve other than to break up the UN and precipitate a catastrophe.

4. Peacetime uses of atomic energy, especially as a source of power, are still imperfectly understood. Blackett offers an adequate summary of the state of current knowledge. From this it appears that to Russia, a power-poor country, the early use of atomic energy for the generation of electrical power must seem much more urgent than to a power-rich US. In the allocation by the ADA of primary plants (where fissionables are produced), from which, according to Blackett, half the total power would have to come, strategic considerations would obviously play a major part. The US does—and can afford to—take the position that security is more important than cheap kilowatts, and thus to some

extent forgo the promise of the second for the sake of the first. Russia would find this more difficult, but in any case is opposed, as we would be, to placing her economic future in the hands of an international body.

It is quite unnecessary for me to comment further on the foregoing analysis. The points, as given by Blackett, speak adequately for themselves. Their merits and demerits are accessible to the understanding and appraisal of any disinterested person. He has the unfortunate tendency on many controversial issues to resolve doubts in Russia's favor, but the total picture is fairly described by Blackett in these words: "So, in essentials the deadlock remained to the end much as it was at the beginning. For sound objective reasons Russia and America put forward proposals appropriate to their own interests. Owing to the great difference between the strategic situations of the two powers and between the levels of their atomic energy developments, these proposals were completely antagonistic, and each completely unacceptable to the other."

Nor does it seem to me necessary to defend the undeniable virtues, the good will for peace, the breadth of conception underlying the American proposal. The Baruch plan has been adequately written about, and has been the subject of an abundance of oratory, some of it sincere despite its eloquence. However, one general criticism by Blackett of the spirit of the plan seems to me unanswerable. One of the reasons it has failed thus far is that it overreaches itself. It seeks absolute security in a world absolutely insecure. Whether it is guilt, fear or a medley of anxiety neuroses which drives us to seek the kind of safety normally reserved only for the dead is a question one may leave to the social scientists and the psychoanalysts. But the disorder is widely prevalent, manifesting itself no less in internal purges and witch-hunting than in foreign policy. It is obviously unjust to accuse the American people of imperialist designs; but our craving for security impels us to demands which can only be met through a world hegemony.

For all its bias and shortcomings Blackett's is a notable achievement. It sets itself courageously against blindness and prejudice. It demolishes myths and with inexorable logic demonstrates the baselessness of our wild fears. It combines a mastery of facts with an exceptional ability to organize and present them. Anyone who has tried to bring the innumerable elements of this problem into proper order will appreciate Blackett's accomplishment.

Apart from legitimate criticism, malicious and unfair things have been said about the opinions voiced in this book. A few weeks after it appeared Blackett won the Nobel Prize in physics. World recognition, which added further authority to his views, led to an increase in the vehemence of the attacks against him. A statement issued by the British UN delegation and distributed to the delegates of other nations calls him names in a manner not usually associated with the Foreign Office. Also, considering the fact that the delegates had probably not read his book, it is hard to see what the refutation of its arguments was expected to accomplish. There and elsewhere Blackett is accused of belittling the atomic bomb as just another weapon and of similar mischief. This is palpably absurd. Better than any politician he understands and has described the horrors of a third world war. That he has avoided apocalyptic spasms makes his exposition the more convincing. He has put matters into a perspective hitherto concealed from us. He has named the real villain of the piece—ignorance. If he has failed completely in his attempt to show us a way out, it is, perhaps, because he is not God. Unlike many others, at least he knows it.



ISRAEL GOES TO THE POLLS

The citizens of the new state are about to cast their ballots to elect delegates to their first Constitutional Assembly

by J. L. Teller

SOME 300,000 men and women from cities, villages and communal and co-operative settlements will be casting their ballots for delegates to the Constitutional Assembly in Israel's first elections, to be held in December.

The overwhelming majority of voters will cast ballots for the two socialist parties, moderate Mapai and pro-Soviet-oriented Mapam. Moscow, London and Washington undoubtedly will be watching the margin retained by Mapai over Mapam because Mapai has been the strongest party in the Palestine Jewish community, no less the party of the urban white-collar class and government bureaucracy than that of the proletariat. Of equal interest domestically—and, from a larger view, internationally—will be the strength mustered at the polls by a new party, Tnuat Cherut (Freedom Movement), the political metempsychosis of the one-time Irgun underground.

Mapam's and Mapai's respective political fortunes depend in large measure on American policy with regard to Israel at the General Assembly in Paris and on the resilience shown there by Mapai's Moshe Shertok, slight, brusque, mustached and blunt-nosed Israeli Foreign Minister. If he does not slip up by yielding to Foreign Office-State Department pressure and acceding to compromise, Mapai will face the electorate with an ace up its sleeve. Moreover, the country's whole attention is riveted on winning the war on the field of battle even more than on the diplomatic front, and with Premier David Ben-Gurion in the Defense Ministry, Mapai will claim all credit for achievements in both these spheres.

Mapai has been, for more than a quarter of a century the dynamo of Histadrut, the powerful labor federation which, through its innumerable co-operatives, is the largest single employer in the country. This has given Mapai great prestige among the electorate, but the opposition has charged that it has also given the party an economic instrument of coercion.

It was, as a matter of fact, because of the latter allegation that a minority group within Mapai, fighting the reign of the bureaucracy, broke away from Mapai, and, joining with two other socialist parties, laid the foundations for Mapam. If nothing occurs in the sphere of foreign affairs to embarrass Mapai, whatever votes Mapam draws in excess of its actual membership rolls will have been siphoned off from Mapai, entirely because of gripes over Histadrut affairs. Mapam has also been enlisting converts among DP's in Europe preparing to immigrate to Israel.

In addition to their dominance in Histadrut, Mapai men have held, for nearly two decades, key posts on the Jewish Agency Executive, the egg from which the Israeli government was hatched. Recent events have moderated Mapai's enthusiasm for its long-time ally, the British Labor Party, and tempered its vociferous anti-Soviet atti-

tude. At Zionist Congress after Zionist Congress, Mapai had helped to elect to the presidency of the World Zionist Organization, sage and confident Dr. Chaim Weizmann, who now occupies the purely nominal post of President of Israel. Dr. Weizmann probably still retains much of his one-time unflagging faith in British fair play and in a joint Anglo-Jewish destiny in the Middle East. He supported Mapai's domestic policies, involving large Zionist fund allocations for co-operative projects and a selective Zionist immigration program giving preference to ideologically indoctrinated, agriculture-trained labor elements over an organized influx of the urban, petty-merchant class.


It wasn't until World War II that Mapai—caught between the febrile personal ambition of fitfully militant David Ben-Gurion, impatient for Weizmann's mantle, and dissidents within the party—began to deviate from the aged Zionist chief's straight course of collaboration with Britain. Ben-Gurion pushed through the supreme Zionist councils, with Dr. Weizmann reluctantly concurring, the Biltmore program (so called because first approved by a Zionist emergency conference at New York's Hotel Biltmore), requesting that the mandatory government relinquish to the Jewish Agency all control over immigration into Palestine as a first step in ceding governmental functions to the Jews.

This program was opposed by the two groups that now constitute the basic strength of Mapam—Hashomer Hatzair and the Mapai dissidents. The



MOSHE SNEH (LEFT) AND AHARON ZISLING, OF MAPAM, ISRAEL'S PRO-SOVIET PARTY

This is the second of six articles on Israel by J. L. Teller, a Middle Eastern expert. The third will describe the situation of Arabs living under Israeli rule.



DRAWINGS BY GEORGE KORFF

LEFT TO RIGHT: PREMIER DAVID BEN-GURION, PRESIDENT CHAIM WEIZMANN AND FOREIGN MINISTER MOSHE SHERTOR

nature of their agreement underscored the large areas of disagreement between them. Hashomer Hatzair opposed the Biltmore program's "bristling nationalism" and plumped, instead, for its own program for a bi-national Arab-Jewish workers' state. The Mapai dissident faction argued that Jews stood a better chance of eventually achieving statehood if they temporarily deferred the larger issue and pressed for the abolition of the White Paper.

The Mapai dissidents stood alone in the socialist-Zionist movement in their early advocacy of guerrilla activity against military installations to force the British into a more amenable frame of mind, and their spokesmen in Haganah sponsored the establishment of a special shock brigade, the Palmach. They and Hashomer Hatzair agreed that Zionist-socialism must take a firm position against world imperialism.

This latter stand was one of the innumerable contradictions in the program of Hashomer Hatzair. To this group the Lenin revolution has always been, and is to this day, a kind of Marxist Immaculate Conception. Yet, none the less, for years it supported Dr. Weizmann's pro-British policies. Dedicated as much as any group in Zionism to the actual yeoman work of

state building, the members of the group have always been distinguished by an unfaltering faith in Russia, which required banishing from the mind the grim fact that their own comrades were languishing in Siberia in penance for clandestine activity. They now feel their faith has been vindicated by Russia's switch in policy.

As individuals they can be identified after a brief conversation by that unique air of forgiving aloofness, bordering on snobbism, characteristic of introverted religious orders. The way of life in their agricultural communes has a greater mood-affinity with the Essenes of Christ's day than with the Russian *kolkhoz*.

Mapai leaders have all the flexibility of the seasoned professional politician. At the top, Ben-Gurion and Shertok still cherish a profound admiration for British ways and manners. Both are surrounded—in subconscious compensation perhaps—by Oxonian-accented aides. Shertok has even acquired, when speaking English, the faint, hesitant stammer generally associated with the British diplomat.

Mapam leaders are, for the most part, rugged, homespun individuals, who still reside in communal settlements and are only "on leave" with the party or government. They are men like

Aharon Zisling, Israeli Agriculture Minister, a blue-eyed giant who, until his accession to the cabinet, defiantly wore his shirt over his pants in Russian fashion. Mapam leaders of the old vintage are rigid doctrinaires, incapable of making themselves intelligible beyond the ranks of votaries of socialist dialectics. It seems that the job of explaining Mapam to the electorate at large has been entrusted to a recent convert, Dr. Moshe Sneh, who some day, if he succeeds in attracting new mass elements, may yet kidnap the movement from its early saints.

Pot-bellied, mustached and pasty-faced, with flabby white hands, Dr. Sneh, a physician, looks strictly middle-class, and is absolutely incongruous in the Mapam environment of tanned, muscular, intellectual proletarians. At one time the Jewish Agency's supervisor over the affairs of the then clandestine Haganah, Sneh, a General Zionist, was suspected even of flirting with Irgun. Just when rumors had spread that he would throw in his lot with them, he suddenly revealed himself as a latter-day saint of Mapam. A journalist with a gift for slogans, a good speaker and a brilliant polemist, he is commonly regarded as an unabashed opportunist. Now having cast his bread upon the waters, he seems

confident the turbulent sea of Mediterranean politics will yet reward him.

The very existence of Mapam, and its firebrand electioneering, may increase Mapai's strength by acquiring for the latter non-labor, non-socialist ballots. Some middle-class voters may hope in this way to avert the election of a large Mapam delegation to the Constitutional Assembly. Furthermore, Mapai, with its conciliatory, New Dealish domestic policies and its extreme sensitivity to public opinion in the West, really has become a middle-of-the-road liberal party.

There has never been a strong non-socialist middle-class party in Palestine. The General Zionist Party, comprising both conservative and liberal elements, has exercised influence far beyond its infinitesimal local strength because of the powerful General Zionist movement outside Palestine. Now, functioning as a native political party within the structure of the state of Israel, the General Zionists must rely on their local strength of 5,000 ballots. Even that has been dissipated by a split between conservative and liberal elements, the latter joining Aliya Chadasha to form a new progressive party.

Aliya Chadasha, the New Settlers' Group, originally formed to further the interests of immigrants from Germany, is completely discredited with the electorate at large because, almost to the eve of Britain's evacuation it has followed a consistent, persistent pro-British line. In June, 1946, when the top men of the Jewish Agency Executive were rounded up by British police and placed in internment camps,

Aliya Chadasha published a demand that the entire executive, not even excepting Dr. Weizmann, resign over their failure to establish good relations with the mandatory government and that a new executive, acceptable to the British, be formed.

All-out efforts to enlist the middle-class vote will, of course, be made by Tnuat Cherut (Freedom Movement), which is also directing its appeal to the underprivileged elements in Israel, to the recently arrived DP's, who are tough as nails and bristling with real and fictitious grievances against governmental authority, and to the Jews from the Arab countries, the carpet-baggers of Israel. Because it is not represented in the coalition, the Freedom Movement, unlike other parties, will be able to lash out against alleged and real government abuses and errors in all spheres—the diplomatic, the military and economic. It will make much of the housing shortage, of the difficulties resulting from the government's acceptance of the second truce. The Irgun's underground record will not be without appeal to the voter.

The program of the Freedom Movement calls for the extension of Israeli rule over all of Palestine. The movement still regards Transjordan as part of Palestine and does not recognize its severance under the Churchill White Paper of 1922. It demands the breaking up of "trusts," presumably the dissolution of the industrial coöperatives established by Histadrut, the labor federation. The conduct of these co-operatives has been a cause of schism within Mapai itself. The program asks a limit on farm holdings and the

distribution of great properties; although a pledge of continued support to all types, including coöperative farming, is given, it may mean that some of the large *kibbutzim* would be asked to relinquish part of their land. It may mean this, and it may not.


The Freedom Movement's program contains many such ambiguities. Intriguing is a plank in the platform which states that the Freedom Movement advocates that Israel maintain amicable relations with France and all freedom-loving states. The singling out of France, which has not yet recognized Israel but is Britain's contender in the Levant and the patron of the Maronite Christians, may not be without significance, especially in light of the effort Irgun has invested to establish contacts in France.

A large bloc of votes will go to the religious parties—Agudat Israel and the laborite Poale Agudat Israel, and Mizrachi and the laborite Hapoel Hamizrachi. In the past, Mizrachi and Agudah differed in that the former was Zionist and the latter opposed Zionism, warning against "precipitating the Redemption" by establishing the state before the arrival of the Messiah. Now that the state is a fact, and many Agudah members have died in its defense, the basic difference between the two religious groups has disappeared. Only vested interests prevent their amalgamation in a joint effort to foist orthodox dogmatism on the institutions and executive organs, and infuse it into the constitution and legislation of the new state.

Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and Mapai seem to have plotted to prevent a merger of the two religious parties by deliberately favoring Agudah over Mizrachi, and tomorrow perhaps reversing the order of preference. Mizrachi has retaliated by mildly flirting with the Freedom Movement, which is the single secular party that has shown deference for religious tradition. Mapai's balance-of-power game with the religious parties has not gone unnoticed by the implacable Mapam Marxists, who are bitterly accusing Ben-Gurion of "appeasing the clericals."



RABBI YITZCHAK LEVIN (LEFT), OF AGUDAT ISRAEL, AND RABBI JUDAH FISHMAN, OF MIZRACHI



FAME WILL SPUR an increasing number of trade-union leaders to step up labor political action, as they now see some of their colleagues holding high public office. Full-time trade-union officers now moving into the House of Representatives are Leonard Irving, Kansas City, AFL Laborers; Roy Wier, Minneapolis, secretary of the Central Labor Union; George Rhodes, Reading, editor of the *New Era*, AFL labor paper; Thomas Burke, secretary-treasurer of the Toledo Industrial Union Council, CIO. Three CIO men, including two business agents, were elected to the Rhode Island state legislature.

★

"Those who favor the taking over of the Democratic Party by the farmer and labor and liberal organizations have a strong argument in their favor," writes the Social-Democratic Federation's *New Leader* (New York), in its first post-election analysis. "Truman has proved that the Democratic Party can win as a liberal party, a civil rights party, a social security party, a working man's party."

The *New Leader* is not the only traditionally third-party journal that sees the 1948 election results as a blow to immediate or early launching of a "third party" in America. The older "independent party" groups have a background of historical knowledge against which to measure current new-party strength.

In 1912, Theodore Roosevelt polled 27.4 percent of the votes. In 1920, Debs, on the Socialist Party line, polled nearly a million votes, or about four percent. In 1924, La Follette polled nearly five million votes (17.1 percent). Wallace polled only slightly more than Debs—and proportionately

did less than one-third as well. The Thomas vote is still unknown, although in New York City it rose from 5,693 in 1944 to 26,742 in 1948.

The number of votes for Farrell Dobbs and Grace Carlson (Socialist Worker Party candidates) will not be known for many days and perhaps weeks. Against this background, Norman Thomas predicts "an effort by the liberal elements to capture the party [Democratic] and ultimately furnish the leadership of which Mr. Truman is incapable. Pending the outcome of that effort, our socialist hopes for a rapid reorganization of a new mass party *must be held in abeyance*."

★

The attempts of the traditional Marxists to pour the new political phenomenon into old semantic bottles produces interesting results. The *Militant* maintains that "the Democratic Party has transformed itself into a special American variation of the European People's Fronts. The alliance of the working class with the liberal bourgeoisie has here been consummated in truly unique and original fashion."

The *Daily Worker* records the same phenomenon, while avoiding the phraseology of the People's Front, to which it was once devoted. Communist Party Secretary Eugene Dennis says that the people "elected a Democratic congressional majority composed of a number of *progressives, as well as a group of Social-Democrats*, a sizable bloc of *pro-labor* Northern machine wheelhorses, and Southern Bourbons." Further, says Dennis, "on a national scale, the *reactionary* Social Democrats have, for the moment, strengthened some of their positions." Identified as "reactionary Social Democrats" are David Dubinsky, Walter Reuther, Hubert Humphrey, Paul H. Douglas, Chester Bowles, the CIO and the ADA.

In criticism of the Progressive Party campaign, the *Daily Worker* says that "left wing forces, including Communists," fell down on the job of unmasking "the treacherous role and influence of the trade union bureaucracy and Social Democracy." It warns that "the Progressive Party will have to

combat within some sections of its own ranks the *dangerous* notion that failure to coöperate with the Berles and Hendersons [A. A. Berle Jr. of the Liberal Party and Leon Henderson of the ADA] . . . is responsible for its relatively low vote."

The *ADA World* points out that Democratic Party candidates who turned down IPP support in California (Douglas, Holifield, McKinnon, Doyle, Havenner) were elected, while Democrats who accepted IPP backing (Gallager, Patterson, Healey) were defeated. Also, IPP-supported Charles Savage lost in Washington. New York Liberal Partyites make much of the fact that Paul O'Dwyer, popular brother of the popular Mayor, took American Labor Party endorsement and was defeated by Republican Jake Javits, who had Liberal support. Decisive was the Liberal Party vote of 20,000 alongside the ALP vote of 14,000.

★

The New York *Post* split its pre-election editorial support: Mr. Thackrey for Wallace; Mrs. Thackrey for Dewey. Its post-election editorial hailed the result as a victory for liberalism!

★

The International Association of Machinists is running a smooth campaign to get labor men on local rent boards. The *Machinist* notes that of the 760 rent advisory boards in the country, 299 have no union representatives at all.

★

Labor politicians are doing much concrete thinking about the fact that the total *registration* was unusually high while the total *vote* was comparatively low. While ideologies are trying to find "political" reasons, practical labor politicians are trying to find the "mechanical" reasons. Labor can get almost 100-percent registration. The next step is to devise some kind of machinery for Election Day performance. The step beyond that is to create the necessary *interest* and *machinery* for primary elections.

BOOKS IN REVIEW

THEY ALL WROTE TO LINCOLN

by J. G. Randall

TO ASSEMBLED DEVOTEES, the opening of the long-sealed Lincoln papers in those post-midnight moments of July 26, 1947, was an unforgettable occasion. For historians the vast new material will require extended investigation and interpretation. Meanwhile, the subject has been clouded by predictions, questions, guesses, rumors, al-

THE LINCOLN PAPERS: The Story of the Collection, with Selections to July 4, 1861. Edited by David C. Mearns. Introduction by Carl Sandburg (Doubleday and Company; \$10).

leged memories, insinuations, conjectures and ridiculous misstatements. Thus an addition has been made to the age-long accumulation of clichés that have so persistently obscured the genuine Lincoln story. Now with rare charm in the telling, David Mearns, talented scholar of the Library of Congress, traces the history of the collection so vividly that the papers come to life and with them the quaint Illinois leader who was, at times, the nation's "Chief Clerk."

The story of the documents living on through the decades in spite of perils and wanderings until they are now in perfect custody for the future, occupies the major part of Mearns's first volume. In the days of Lincoln's life we are introduced to the "stove-pipe archive," the President-elect's carpetbag, and those bulging White House pigeonholes for which Lincoln cared so much in his "Chinese reverence" for the written word. After April, 1865, the papers, owned by the family (as is the custom), were in the physical keeping of David Davis at Bloomington, Illinois, then of John G. Nicolay at Washington, then of Robert Todd Lincoln in the District of Columbia and Manchester, Vermont.

The secretary-biographers, Nicolay

and Hay, used them, but their ponderous biography was done under Robert's "editing." In addition, despite their Olympian impressiveness, these two "everlasting angels" wrote under the handicap of their own views and personalities. Rereading Nicolay and Hay alongside the papers themselves, one realizes that the collection is valuable chiefly for the kind of human-interest detail which they passed over.

We had been told that Robert planned to burn the papers until Nicholas Murray Butler in August, 1923, persuaded him to put them in the Library of Congress, but Mearns shows clearly the flaws in Butler's reminiscence. The papers were deposited in the Library of Congress in 1919 and the deeding of the collection to the public, sealing them for twenty-one years after Robert's death, occurred eight months before Butler intervened.

Naturally the closure itself caused speculation. On this point Mearns's book offers the best answer yet given. There is no evidence whatever that the papers were closed because of any family skeleton, or that they revealed murderous treason in the cabinet, however much of a headache Stanton may have been to his Chief. To reconstruct the motive as nearly as possible, Robert thought that Nicolay and Hay had made complete use of the papers, which was not true. Also, he seems to have feared that some of the documents would have given pain to living persons (this implies he was not destroying such documents); finally, he was annoyed by incessant requests from investigators, in particular Beveridge. Aside from the twenty-one-year limitation, his ultimate disposition of the collection was admirable.

In addition to an authoritative history of the collection, Mearns gives us a selection from it. To select, of course,

was not easy. The documents run to 41,751 pieces; the period, up to early July, 1861, from which selections were made, constitutes about a fourth of the whole; the Mearns volumes contain only a portion of that fourth. It may be regrettable that certain bodies of material are omitted—e.g., a considerable correspondence about the time of the 1858 debates, and the remarkable preliminary worksheets for the 1861 Inaugural in which we see Lincoln developing phrase by phrase his eloquent emphasis upon peace, non-aggression and union. What this amounts to, however, is not that one should cavil at the editor or publisher, but that the historian or serious student should still go to the originals.

From the vast and rich mass of documents we are given typical samplings of what was written to Lincoln by people high and low, and all the way between. Political communications appear along with letters from subliterate folk, including some of Lincoln's humble relatives. We see Lincoln in 1849 unsuccessfully pulling wires for appointment as commissioner of the general land office. We have appeals, threats, gibes, advice, statesmanlike counsel, politicians' demands, patronage requests, party squabbles, poignant personal tragedies, and deep questions of state—in short, the voluminous stream that flowed over the presidential (and pre-presidential) mill.

While numerous Lincoln holographs are included (e.g., drafts of out-going letters or speeches), the great bulk of the collection consists of papers received. They will be drawn upon for diverse themes: for the lingo and pattern of Lincoln's day, for an occasional earthy fable, for evidences of human folly or greed, for bygone excitements that seem stupid in retrospect, for glimpses or self-portraits of Lincoln's contemporaries, and for the psycho-

logical atmosphere of a day when assassination was threatened and the seizure of Washington predicted.

In addition, the reviewer would like to suggest that in what people wrote to Lincoln we see a reflection of the man. We learn how he was regarded. We see him as inventor, office seeker, raconteur, leading lawyer, important Illinois Whig, a man of known modesty, desired as after-dinner speaker, recipient of gifts (including an LL.D. from Knox College), awaking like Byron to find himself famous. We see him, perhaps unfortunately, avoiding declarations and remaining in dignified retirement during the campaign of 1860. In the shattering and frenzied crisis that followed his election we see him preserving a calm bearing, and steering the ship, but not provocatively, through the wretched hazards of the Sumter episode.

Among other misconceptions we must discard the idea that the 1947 opening was a disappointment and the papers unexciting. There has been a quickening of the pulse and a keen enjoyment among those who have worked with them. As a quarry of social history they are of prime value. To a remarkable extent they hold a mirror to American life.

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EUROPE UNITED

THE WEST AT BAY, by Barbara Ward (Norton; \$3.50).

BARBARA WARD is already famous at 34 as a writer and speaker on current affairs. She is the foreign-affairs editor of the London *Economist* and a Governor of the British Broadcasting Corporation. In the present book, her first to be published in this country, she argues for a Western Association as the only basis for enduring prosperity and political stability in Europe. The book clearly is intended for the general reader, but even those who have devoted a good deal of time and thought to European problems might find it provocative at many points; and certainly few will dispute its thesis.

At least, given the underlying premise that men of good will may still be able to shape the future.

One need only glance at the news from France, however, to be aware that this premise is now much in question. What about de Gaulle? Oddly, the special problems of postwar France come in for only briefest mention in *The West at Bay*; in all they are discussed in two paragraphs. Of de Gaulle, Miss Ward observes that "in the past, authoritative regimes with an anti-communist bias have always ended up by violating the most elementary of the workers' rights, and it is difficult to see how such a development in France could fail to create the same barrier as now divides Spain from the other Western States." The more pessimistically inclined will probably feel that such a development might be the occasion alternatively for the removal of the barrier to Spain. But certainly in either case the result for Western Association would be fatal.

The argument for Western Association touches unevenly on a great variety of topics, ranging from Far Eastern nationalism to the general nature and limitations of the Marxian philosophy of capitalism (under the heading of the "communist challenge"). Probably the most valuable parts from many points of view are those dealing with the "dollar shortage," the possible nature and functions of Western Association, and the attempt to anticipate difficulties.

As is well known, Western Europe already has achieved a considerable economic recovery from the war damage and disorganization. There is a real chance that within a short time the prewar production level will be re-attained and in many countries surpassed. Currently, however, this area still suffers from a large-scale "dollar shortage," i. e., lack of means to pay for minimum essential imports. Will it ultimately be able to bring its foreign economic accounts into balance? The outlook, as the Western European countries are presently organized, is by no means bright, for a variety of factors will tend persistently to dis-

locate their foreign economic relations.

Some of these factors stem from the war: such as, for one thing, the disruption of and continuing limitations on East-West trade, and, for another, the British loss of foreign assets. This last factor will limit Britain's capacity to pay for imports for many years to come. Some of the forces for dislocation, however, operated even before the war to disrupt multilateral trade: such as US tariff protection *cum* technical superiority and Far Eastern competition, and, on the opposite side of the shield, British technical obsolescence. These factors made all the difference between the smooth-working multilateral system of the late nineteenth century, under British hegemony, and the dislocated multilateral system of recent decades, with the USA predominant. They continue to have a role, and no doubt, as Miss Ward argues, an important one, in the current situation.

It must be recalled, finally, that the experts who worked on the Marshall Plan, particularly those in Washington, were themselves not especially optimistic. According to the American experts, Western Europe in the fiscal year 1951-52 may still be short almost \$3 billion in its foreign-trade accounts.

The "dollar shortage" thus becomes one of the main problems in the economic field with which the Western Association must cope.

"Western Association" is Miss Ward's own designation, and evidently she wishes to emphasize by this name the loose-knit character of the scheme she proposes. There will be varying degrees and responsibilities of membership. In the economic field, the central controls can and should be held to a minimum. It will be necessary to deal at once with the most urgent problems, such as the dollar shortage and the allocation of scarce materials, and also to assure in the future a tolerably stable economic growth. Along Keynesian lines, however, it is reasoned that stability can be achieved by capital investment planning and without detailed intervention in the economy.

In the case of key industries, such as steel and coal, steps may be taken toward Europe-wide organization and even "internationalization." (This, of course, has been proposed as one basis for an approach to the German economic-war-potential problem; regretably Miss Ward makes no reference to this aspect.) Another function of the Association would be simply to take steps to remove trade and other Balkanizing restrictions. The ultimate aim is to establish an all-Western Europe free-trade area.

Could even these limited arrangements be put into effect? The answer is that no one can know with certainty until the attempt is made; that there is now no alternative but to try them; and, finally, that initial steps already have been taken, particularly in Paris in connection with the Marshall Plan, and in the Brussels defense pact of March, 1948. Miss Ward was unable to deal in her book with the Paris OEEC, which was set up by the sixteen nations in April, 1948. It is clear that this already provides a framework.

What about Russia? To many, Miss Ward will probably seem overoptimistic in thinking that five or six years of "unhostile containment" might dispel Russia's fears, particularly if, as she conjectures, the Western Association begins to exercise an attraction in the East. Undoubtedly she is on firmer ground when she argues that the very fact of instability in the West is itself a cause of international tension.

Clearly, if the Western Association is to have any chance at all it will require the active support of the United States. Tactfully Miss Ward points out that for this some of our most cherished beliefs will have to be modified, including those on international trade (in order to conserve dollars, the Association might have to discriminate against us in a transition period) and the sacredness of free enterprise.

Necessarily there will also have to be defense commitments. Here, perhaps, Miss Ward is not sufficiently emphatic. As she observes, no sane man or woman in the West contemplates with pleasure the gradual emergence

of the defense problem into first place. Yet it probably cannot be stressed too strongly than an unwillingness on our part to join in their defense might affect in the most decisive way the willingness of the sixteen nations to cast their lot together.

Among recent writings for the general public on current European problems this book is outstanding. It has been compared with Keynes's *Economic Consequences of the Peace*. It does not detract at all from Miss Ward's achievement to say that the comparison is hardly warranted. It is to be hoped that she is just as widely read.

ABRAM BERGSON

Abram Bergson is an associate professor of Economics at Columbia University. During the war he served with the OSS as Chief of the Economics Subdivision of the USSR Division. Bergson was a member of the American delegation to the Reparations Conference, Moscow, 1945. He is the author of Structure of Soviet Wages.

STRANGE FRIENDS

JAPAN DIARY, by Mark Gayn (William Sloane Associates; \$4).

MARK GAYN's day-by-day chronicle of his almost two-year tour of duty as a correspondent in Japan and Korea, beginning in December, 1945, is a thoughtful, carefully documented and depressing book that deserves the serious attention of any possible new policy-makers in Washington. Its chief value is its detailed reporting; its conclusions are exactly the ones that have been reached by every experienced liberal observer of our policy of dogged support of collapsing Chinese reaction. From fear of Russia and an instinctive devotion to the status quo, we prop up the most backward and corrupt forces throughout the Far East, destroying our reputation as a progressive democratic nation and virtually push into the arms of Moscow the oppressed non-Communist masses most eager to be our friends.

It is a defeatist quality in our social and political thinking that promises to be as disastrous as it is unrealistic. Gayn and such other reporters on the spot as are not terrified by the very name of communism try to remind us that, though we may be satisfied with

any corrupt and moribund medieval anachronism if **only** it is anti-Russian enough, the people of Asia are less easily satisfied.

In both Japan and Korea, the author of *Japan Diary* reports, the pattern has been tragically the same. When our occupying armies landed, they found the long-submerged democratic leaders and the victimized people ready to receive them happily as heralds of peace and freedom, while those who had made war on us or had profited by the war-making activities cowered in dread. Now, after three and a half years, only a handful of the guilty have found their fears justified, while the rest have been restored to much of their old-time power. Meanwhile, the hopeful progressive elements have been regarded with increasing suspicion and hostility as agents of the USSR.

The record in Japan has a few cheering aspects. As even Nozaka, the Communist leader who was known to Americans in China during the war as Okano, admitted to Gayn, there have been several achievements.

"The new Constitution," he said, "has had a deep effect on the nation. It has reduced the emperor's powers. The various reforms have dealt a blow to the feudal forces. The blow is not fatal, but it's heavy. If the Occupation forces remain here another five years the progressive forces will be able to block the efforts of the Old Guard to seize power." The author adds other accomplishments:

We have allowed the emergence of large and vigorous parties of the Left—notably the Social Democrats. Together with unions, they have done a tremendous job of political education. By tilting the scales constantly in favor of the conservatives, we have deprived the progressives of an even chance in the coming struggle, but in cities as in the country there will be thousands of men to champion reform. We shall also leave behind, as our legacy to Japan, a skepticism for the shabby doctrines of Shintoism, and a measure of disrespect for the omniscient and omnipotent police.

The original MacArthur directives



were excellent, even if they were ignored or badly carried out in practice. Yet Shintoism, linked with the imperial myth, is once more on the rise, the Old Guard is again in control of Diet and Cabinet, rural government remains under the control of the landlords, land reform is made ludicrous by its violations, the purge of war leaders has become a sham, labor sees the MacArthur regime becoming a strikebreaker, the old thought-control police are emerging in new positions of power, the Zaibatsu is regaining its former influence, and we continue to restore the emperor to his old-time popularity.

Meanwhile, MacArthur worship, temporarily replacing that of the Mikado, keeps up the Japanese tradition of humble obedience to an exalted and all-knowing leader. And Gayn believes that the Japanese army is in a position to emulate the German Reichswehr, after the First World War, in preparing the state for a new armed struggle after the departure of our army of occupation.

It is not a pleasant picture, but it has its alleviations, which is more than can be said for things in Korea, where Gayn finds the situation entirely black. On returning to Tokyo from our zone there, he wrote:

I did not think I was either a radical or a dreamer. I was a reporter, who had found, with shame and anguish, that

under our flag—and often with our active encouragement—there had come into being a police state so savage in its suppression of man's elemental liberties that it was difficult to find a parallel for it. I had found in our zone only the shallow verbiage of democracy, and none of its practices. I had found administrative and political ineptness, and an alliance with the darkest reaction.

When the American army of Occupation arrived, it discovered a popular government established by the Korean resistance movement and functioning with considerable success. General Hodge, who by comparison makes MacArthur seem the most progressive of democrats, announced that the Koreans and the Japanese were "the same breed of cat," but seemed to prefer the latter. He overthrew the resistance government, restored the Japanese-trained gendarmerie to power, suppressed all liberals and established a police state that made a farce of the subsequent election, held only after all the progressives and leftists had been jailed. Collaborationists and extreme rightists were retained in power. A police terror, supported by the Americans, continues to reign.

Gayn believes that the Americans and the Russians are equally guilty for the unhappy situation of "liberated" Korea, but at least the Russians allowed the people to introduce reforms and wipe out collaborators. Comparatively, Japan is a democratic paradise.

RICHARD WATTS JR.

GIFT PACKAGES

PRIZE STORIES OF 1948: The O. Henry Awards. Edited by Herschel Brickell (Doubleday and Company; \$3).

THE BEST AMERICAN SHORT STORIES, 1948. Edited by Martha Foley (Houghton Mifflin Company; \$3.75).

THE COLLECTIONS listed above are as depressing as most such annual publications. None of the stories is below the level of slick, technical facility; some of them are very good, and one ("The Whole World Knows," by Eudora Welty) would be unusual in any "year." Further, it is cheering to find that \$700 has been doled out in

prize money (for the O. Henry awards).

The ennui is induced, I think, by the assumptions implicit in such selections. First, there is the fallacious implication that the "best" is necessarily very good, whereas it is only one editor's choice of the best available in what may well be a singularly uninspired term in publishing. Then there is the obviously bored and boring strain to maintain pretensions of "significance" for volumes whose appearance is dictated only by the calendar. "Trends" is a word heavily relied upon by both editors, although they tend to disagree about the portents.

Miss Foley, for example, finds that the little magazines are ceasing to be sources of story material because they "have been devoting a tremendous amount of space to critical writing." ("It is much easier to be critical than creative.") Herschel Brickell, on the other hand, says that these same magazines "have become of late one of the most important sources of material for the volume." Miss Foley speaks of "the overwhelming tension, the terror, the spectre of undefined guilt which . . . are the most obvious attributes of today's short-story writing," and notes "a reemergence of the old-fashioned short story." She fails, however, to include any in a volume which we may conclude to be representative of a formed preference rather than of shaping trends.

Brickell thinks that "the most notable feature of the short-story situation today is the absence of any large number of steady producers of tales of quality and originality." The absence is obvious, but I should think that to expect a "large number" at any time is to be more concerned with the exigencies of his annual undertaking than with the conditions under which literature is produced. Finally, as the "best" commentator on trends I should nominate one of the judges for the same volume who notes that the short story has "undergone the metamorphosis from poster to blotter."

But the least defensible assumption in both volumes is of a community of

serious standards—perhaps I should say of any standards whatever. Notable in this connection is the very slight overlapping in the selections of the two editors. Brickell does suggest as standards (what might be more aptly designated requirements) "originality, excellence in organization of plot and incidents, skill in characterization, and power in moving the emotions." Excellence, skill and power: these broad terms might cover nothing more than the admonishments of a literary agent or of a course in creative writing. In any case, they simply refer the choice of selections to arbitrary personal taste, which is perhaps inevitable when the choice is made by a single editor. Annoying, under these circumstances, is the ponderousness with which they set themselves up as little Academies to confer official distinction on the contemporary market.

A test of the general quality of such yearbooks is a perusal of old volumes in the series. Brickell lists as distinguished former selections Edna Ferber, Ben Ames Williams and Fannie Hurst. And although it is to his credit that he voted against it, well within that tradition is the award of first prize this year to Truman Capote for such a smooth-paper pastiche as "Shut a Final Door."

JOHN FARRELLY

MEN AND EVENTS

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION AND THE MEN WHO MADE IT, by Richard Hofstadter (Alfred A. Knopf; \$4).

RICHARD HOFSTADTER, a young history professor at Columbia University, has written one of the few sensible books on the subject in *The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It*. Only the ghosts of Crèvecoeur, Tocqueville, Bryce and, among those living, Benjamin Wright, Matthew Josephson and Wilfred Binkley could challenge this statement successfully. The second part of Hofstadter's title indicates the method through which he has approached his subject, the exploration of American politics through personalities. In all, he discusses at length more than

twenty prominent American politicians and political thinkers and relates them to the main stream of our political life. It is the method, of course, which was used by Parrington in his monumental *Main Currents in American Thought*, and Hofstadter is witness again that Parrington's method was right the first time.

With the single exception of Wendell Phillips, the figures he has chosen to discuss are the expected—Jefferson, Jackson, Calhoun, etc. The important contribution of the book is that it provides a sharp and challenging analysis of Lincoln, who is presented as he was: a noble man and at the same time a trimmer. Theodore Roosevelt also comes out as he was: the hero who all his life stormed up San Juan Hill to find that the victory had already been won, but who always managed to make the best of a bad situation. Franklin Roosevelt gets a severe going-over: but it is a rounded portrait with none of the one-sided rancor that John T. Flynn and Charles A. Beard have brought to bear upon him.

This is an extremely important book, but it must be read with caution. In his attempt to clear the record of the folk-myths that have grown up about the Lincolns and Roosevelts, Hofstadter himself has made the mistake at times of belittling the genuine contributions of the men he has chosen to represent.

The book, a Knopf fellowship in history, probably will have no general sale, which in these times is bitter for the publisher, but to the student of American history who is seriously searching for what the real experience of life in America has been, its value will be great.

The only criticism that can be made is its failure to include a thoroughgoing discussion of the berserkers: the barn-burners, the Wobblies, the Debs Socialists, the Ruthenberg Communists and what are so coyly called the Wallaceites. But the value of this book is not seriously diminished by these omissions.

GEORGE MAYBERRY

RADIO

Ladies' Day

RADIO'S GREATEST dramatic actress, Helen Hayes, is back on the air again on a regular basis. She is starring, every Sunday night at nine, on CBS's "Electric Theatre," brought to you by the "business-managed, taxpaying electric-light and power companies" of America.

Judged by the opening performance, the program is likely to provide as much haste as Hayes. When any full-bodied play or story is compressed into a half-hour of radio playing time, the emphasis on speed produces a hasty, nervous, often brutally irreverent skipping from climax to climax. Only the peaks can be touched, and the listener who knows the original misses much of the artistic subtlety, the finer tracings that had gone into building the big moments. Nevertheless, meticulous and understanding acting which treats the microphone with respect can do much to offset this fault inherent in dramatic digests. The telescoped radio version can still have excitement, and that is what Miss Hayes achieves.

Her debut on "Electric Theatre" was in "Victoria Regina." Another actress as familiar with the role, which Miss Hayes played for months on the stage, might have gone on and spoken the lines as if she were still surrounded by all the personalized and visual aids the stage provides. Miss Hayes adapted her portrait of the queen to the requirements of non-visual acting, which reaches its audience in the intimacy of the home. The result was a different Victoria, much less regal than the original but with a good deal more of Miss Hayes's own warmth.

Helen Hayes's proficiency in radio acting is no accident. A few years ago, when she did a weekly half-hour on CBS in "Textron Theatre," she made it her business to study the limitations as well as the opportunities of acting into the microphone. She did not sweep into the studio as the grande dame of the stage doing that poor relative

radio the honor of a visit. She showed respect for the different audience that radio would bring her by learning how best to serve that new audience.

Radio recently brought another, and better, play to the air in condensed form. This was "All My Sons," done on NBC's "Screen Guild" show (Thursdays at 10). The cast was excellent, starring Edward G. Robinson, Burt Lancaster and Ona Munson. But I felt sorry for Harry Cronyn, the adapter, who had had to write a brand-new play insecurely based on the material in the original. The "All My Sons" of the radio was not a bad radio play—it was simply a different one masquerading under the old title.

In my private listening log I put an asterisk against the "All My Sons" performance for still another reason. It contained one of the worst commercials I have heard in a long time. That plug came at the end of Act I. The son has just begun to suspect that his father knew the plane cylinders sold to the Army were defective. He threatens to kill the father. Passionately, he repeats: "You heard me, Dad, I'll kill you." There is a blare from the orchestra (brightly), and the announcer's voice (gayly): "How *mild* can a cigarette be!" Isn't there a mood expert on NBC's staff?

Helen Hayes is not the only woman at the moment contributing to intelligent radio. Three mornings a week (Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays at 10:45 a.m.), Eleanor Roosevelt and her daughter Anna (Mrs. Boettiger) are talking to the housewife audience as if it were not completely witless.

I don't agree with some trade-press enthusiasts who feel that the entire morning-radio level of intelligence has been raised by this quarter-hour stanza. But neither do I vote with the hypercritics who have just discovered that Mrs. Roosevelt's voice contains something unfortunate that sounds like an irrelevant, school-girl giggle. There is probably nothing she can do about it, and, as long as she has something to say, it is unimportant. I congratulate the ABC network for giving some mil-

lions of women an opportunity to find adult conversation in daytime radio's wasteland of fatuity.

Another woman is more popularly the rage on the air just now. She is Jo Stafford, who sings pleasantly, surrounded by equally competent people, on two networks. Except for purposes of professional sampling, I am usually too busy to hear this female Sinatra either on the ABC network, Thursdays at 8:30, or on the rival NBC, Tuesdays at seven. But the fact that two coast-to-coast organizations book her is evidence of an approbation that at least deserves mention.

The imaginative Ralph Edwards, who has devoted so much of his life to thinking up stunts for "Truth or Consequences," has built one of his "T. or C." tricks into a full program, "This Is Your Life." Into his NBC studio, Tuesdays at eight, he brings a subject whose life is recreated in

detail. On the premiere, the hero of this radio biography was a thrice-wounded ex-GI whose battlefield ordeal was recreated for the listening audience. The second time out, Edwards went into the life of a 79-year-old codger who once rode a Texas pony to stake a claim in Oklahoma the day the Cherokee Strip was opened.

The people whose careers are unfolded by Edwards are real. From all corners of the Union, he brings into the studio—either in the flesh or via long-distance NBC lines—the people who have figured in the subject's life. There is, of course, a lot of hokum about this kind of show. But it is something new, and there are times when the program gives the listener the feeling that he is at least seeing close at hand, if not participating in, the small things that make up the sum total of an ordinary American's life. Besides, it all helps sell cigarettes.

SAUL CARSON

THEATRE: *Alien Corn*

THE NEW Edna Ferber-George Kaufman play, "Bravo!," deals with refugees from Europe, a valid theme.

What is a refugee? He is a dispossessed person, cut off from his roots—his home, tradition, language, and frequently his livelihood. The problem of language and tradition is important but not always crucial. The loss of a home and of a more or less easily accessible job are problems of economic and emotional security not confined to refugees. Emotional and economic insecurity is an endemic disease even among native citizens. In this sense we are all refugees.

Writers like Ferber and Kaufman almost never attempt plays on such themes in relation to Americans. How then can they be expected to do it successfully when they deal with foreigners? The only altogether effective scene in "Bravo!" is the one in which an ignorant, likable Hollywood star—sketched in the manner of the girl in "Born Yesterday"—is momentarily

introduced. For the rest, the pathos of "Bravo!" is of the stereotyped kind which bids us shed a tear over the learned old Austrian lawyer who is obliged to sell candy and push a hand truck in the garment center. The humor is as conventional because it touches only the obvious conflict between the sophisticated or "romantic" notions of European intellectuals, playboys and dilettantes with the vulgar plainness of semi-literate Americans.

The choice of a once famous Hungarian playwright as the central figure of "Bravo!" shows how superficial is the authors' grasp of their subject. The once successful Hungarian playwright in this country faces nearly the same problems as other workers in the theatre. Molnar, for example, is probably more prosperous than the majority of his American colleagues in the Dramatists' Guild.

What is wryly wistful and sometimes genuinely touching is the dilemma caused by the disappearance

from the face of the map of the special mood of pleasure, elegance and luxuriously cushioned cynicism that once made these playwrights the great purveyors of light entertainment for most of the world's theatre capitals. But that is a very atypical aspect of the refugee problem—as is the subject of unemployment among excellent Continental actors on Broadway. Since "Bravo!" flirts with and seeks to exploit the color associated with all facets of the problem without ever coming to grips with any essential element of it, it remains fundamentally arid throughout.

What makes it impossible for the authors to handle material thoroughly alien to them makes it almost equally difficult for the usually expert George Kaufman to fuse "Bravo!" into a satisfactory production, despite the presence in the cast of such eminently skillful players as Oscar Homolka and Lili Darvas. It is curious to note in this regard that the most convincing performances are given by young Americans—Kevin McCarthy, Jean Carson, King Calder—only because the roles they act are not clouded by the vagueness of the play's unstable premise. Miss Darvas' part (the Hungarian playwright's actress-wife) is a cliché, and Homolka, acting with the grumpiness of a man who has just gotten out of bed, characterizes almost everything except the essence of his part, either because he has not found it or because it does not exist.

In the last analysis, the degree of talent in the individual actors of "Bravo!" has little to do with our final impression of it. The Kaufman directorial technique—admirable in the instance of his normal product—is inadequate to the kind of play "Bravo!" pretends to be. What is wanted in this sort of play is a gentle, tender mood of warm camaraderie. You cannot create such a mood by good timing and a proficiency in making neat points. The actors in "Bravo!," whatever their separate talents, are not brought into any kind of comfortable entity. They seem uneasy strangers.

HAROLD CLURMAN

MOVIES

Quiet Week

THE AGING Gallic pixie, Sacha Guitry, would divert us now with an amorous episode recaptured (he says) from the life of Napoleon. "Mlle. Désirée" is the story of a little bourgeoisie who almost married the Corsican, did indeed marry Bernadotte, became thus Queen of Sweden and through her husband spurred on the British to destroy the impulsive lover who had jilted her for Josephine. Thus the course of history bends to the fury of a woman scorned.

Guitry has divided his chronicle into two parts, and given the Napoleon role in the first half to Jean-Louis Barrault. Since he has no part to play in the chronicle of the early years, Guitry appears from moment to moment as the narrator. His comments are exceedingly arch—I gathered from the bilingual laughter around me that not all the quips have emerged in the subtitles—and partly for this reason, partly because Barrault is as ludicrously unlikely a Napoleon as the theatre has produced, this section has just enough farce to keep it alive.

But when Guitry takes over the Napoleonic burden, he becomes acutely serious and the little intrigue grinds to a stop in a rut of imperial detail. It may be that even the most irreverent of Frenchmen is not immune to the Bonaparte legend, or perhaps Guitry is paying a debt of patriotism for past transgressions. In any case, he loses his playfulness like an abruptly sobered drunk, and the second half of the film has just about the sparkle you expect from a hangover.

Geneviève Guitry plays the spurned Désirée in the opening stanza; Gaby Morlay does the job in the conclusion. In both cases, the job is principally to watch their peacocks promenade.

Since it contains the traditional scene in which the hero and the villain approach each other stiff-legged and

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with hands hovering over their holsters, "Blood on the Moon" may qualify as a Western. If you want to be technical, however, it is really homicide on horseback—the wrongdoing is a little postgraduate for a real Western, and Robert Mitchum plays too tarnished a hero for juvenile imitation. It's an exciting enough tale of cattle larceny on an Indian reservation, and Mitchum's broken face photographs well, but I found myself thinking that with all the sordidness there is in the world it was too bad the range country had lost its innocence.

Quite a bit of attention has been given locally to the British "Dulcimer Street," but that is probably because life has been very quiet since we all turned out to see the big Joan of Arc burning. The new Rank film demonstrates again how cleverly the English can concoct a dish out of scraps from the roast, but it still makes lean fare.

The story is the one about the high drama to be uncovered in any modest house on any quiet London side street, in this case involving the decent tenants in theft, murder, love and messages from the spirit world.

Alastair Sim gives another of his wonderful impersonations, being here a fraudulent, down-at-the-heels medium named Mr. Squales; Richard Attenborough, England's foremost unlicked puppy, tries so hard to prove he's a real sport that he ends up in the dock on a murder charge. Despite the melodrama and despite some fine, broad character parts handled by Joyce Carey and Ivy St. Helier, the film never does more than muddle along. The love affair between Miss Carey's reduced gentle lady and the iniquitous Mr. Squales would have been richly funny, but Attenborough's inept life of crime kept interfering with their ectoplasmic romance.

ROBERT HATCH

RECORDS: Mostly Vocal Music

"LA DAMOISELLE ÉLUE," which Claude Debussy composed at the age of 27 to a French translation of Rossetti's "The Blessed Damozel," is enjoying a sudden restoration to public favor. So delicate in sonorities and so attenuated in structure that it seems to evaporate at regular intervals during its 20-minute course, "La Damoiselle Élie" was long consigned to the attic well-filled with the inconclusive pieces written by great composers before their musical ideas and workmanship matured. Last year both the Boston Symphony and the New York Philharmonic-Symphony uncorked its forgotten perfume, and nearly everyone agreed that the fragrance was pleasant, if decidedly mild.

Now Eugene Ormandy and the Philadelphia Orchestra have made the first American recording of it (Columbia MM-761, \$4.75), with the aid of Bidu Sayao, soprano, Rosalind Nadell, contralto, and a women's chorus from the University of Pennsylvania. The

members of the orchestra—especially some of the woodwind soloists—play the music with exquisite discretion; the solo and choral parts sound French and daintily mystical, except for a few minutes of tired tone from Miss Sayao, who has been working too hard in recent seasons; and Ormandy coordinates the performers with masterly precision. Some of his tempos may be sentimentally slow, but on the whole the album is one of the best either Ormandy or Columbia has issued in months.

With Eileen Farrell as a distinguished soprano soloist, Leopold Stokowski directs the picked groups of players called "his symphony orchestra" in Wagner's settings of five poems by Mathilde Wesendonck (Victor DM-1233, \$4.75). To the romantic, the connection of Mathilde (who is credited with inspiring "Tristan und Isolde") with the songs will be a good selling point, though her importance

to Wagner has always been exaggerated.

In its own right, the music—"Der Engel," "Stehe Still!," "Im Triebhaus," "Schmerzen" and "Träume"—is some of Wagner's finest. The recording is magnificent, with the new richness and lifelike quality the Victor engineers first gave the public last spring in Stokowski's album of Tchaikovsky's "The Sleeping Beauty." Miss Farrell's voice, warm, dynamic and securely supported, deserves the tribute of this superior engineering, and Stokowski's treatment of the music achieves splendor without excess.

Last fall an agreeable monomaniac named William H. Scheide gathered together a group of young vocalists and instrumentalists to concentrate upon the sections of Bach's cantatas and other vocal works that require solo voices. After giving a series of four New York concerts, the Bach Aria Group committed to discs an assortment of six arias, drawn from the 650 which Scheide describes as "vocal chamber music" (Vox 367, \$6).

The music is skillfully performed, in the sense that the artists understand the equality and mutual contrapuntal interplay of the vocal and instrumental parts. The arias, from five sacred cantatas and a secular one, are varied in tempo, texture and figuration, and give a glimpse of the wide, expressive and technical range to be encountered in the vast array of 650 movements. The singers cope reasonably well with the purely vocal difficulties of the music, and it is probably ungrateful to observe that their chief virtue is that they do nothing wrong. That is an accomplishment of itself, and in another year or two the Bach Aria Group may be ready to communicate as well as demonstrate.

Communication is the inescapable quality of Madeleine Grey's electrifying singing in a group of five "Songs of the Auvergne" (Victor MM-758, \$4.75), overarranged for mezzo-soprano and orchestra by a minor French musician, Marie-Joseph Canteloube,

whose musical thinking is about what André Kostelanetz's would be if Kostelanetz had studied with as imposing a teacher as Vincent d'Indy. Miss Grey (whose incomparable records of Ravel's "Chansons Madécasses" were re-released by Vox last year) makes a lively set of character pieces out of the little tunes, and projects them with such honorable sentiment that the Canteloube falsifications are minimized.

Jennie Tourel, one of our most esteemed serious recitalists, tries to let her hair down in a new Offenbach album ("Jennie Tourel Sings Offenbach," Columbia MX-299, \$2.90), with results that are drear. In the Barcarolle from "The Tales of Hoffmann" she imitates Heifetz's Bach Concerto by singing a duet with herself, ensuring synchronization of the two parts by utter rigidity of meter; you can almost hear her counting "one-two-three-four-five-six." The other three selections are all taken from "La Périochole" (including a waltz which will be an old friend to Ballet Russe patrons of "Gaîté Parisienne"). Here, unfettered by an alter ego, Miss Tourel is somewhat less constrained, but a Parisian audience would not consider her saucy.

Marian Anderson sings a volume of spirituals, some of which she has done before (Victor MO-1238, \$5), demonstrating that, in the main, the state of her voice is still good. Spirituals are also vaguely involved in an album by Adolf Busch and his chamber orchestra ("Spirituals Transcribed for Chamber Orchestra," Columbia MM-764, \$3.90). These have to be heard to be believed, if they can be then. Underneath a miasma of late-Romantic, Munich-conservatory, symphonic-poem muck, Busch buries the original melodies almost completely. Let it be noted ironically that Busch is one of the chief arbiters of taste for the New Friends of Music, an institution dedicated to the purest standards in chamber music. I, for one, shall be thinking of these spirituals when he plays Brahms sonatas with Rudolf Serkin in December. CECIL SMITH

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